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ERISA: DO HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS HAVE
STANDING TO BRING A CIVIL ENFORCEMENT
ACTION UNDER SECTION 1132(a)?
David P. Kallus*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA)' to protect the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in employee pension plans.' ERISA imposes minimum
participation, 3 vesting4 and funding standards on such plans, and
establishes rules concerning reporting,' disclosure7 and fiduciary re-
sponsibility.' Further, to eliminate "the threat of conflicting and in-
consistent State and local regulation" 9 of employee pension plans,
o 1990 by David P. Kallus.
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and to the memory of my father, Malcolm F. Kallus.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1982) (ERISA's declared policy is "to protect ... the interests
of participants in private pension plans and their beneficiaries"); H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4639 ("The
primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension rights. ... ); see Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A..Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720 (1984) ("Congress wanted to
guarantee that 'if a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement-and
if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit-he actually will
receive it.' " (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375
(1980))); Taggart Corp. v. Life and Health Benefits Admin., Inc., 617 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("ERISA's legislative history demonstrates that its drafters were principally con-
cerned with abuses occurring in respect of private pension assets."), cert. denied sub nora.
Taggart Corp. v. Efros, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981).
The terms "employee pension benefit plan" and "pension plan" are defined at section
1002(2)(A) of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). (1982); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2
(1988) (Dept. of Labor regulations further defining what does and does not constitute an em-
ployee pension benefit plan for purposes of ERISA).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
4. Id. § 1053.
. d. §§ 1082-1085.
6. Id. §§ 1021-1031.
7. Id.
8. Id. §§ 1101-1114.
9. 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent), quoted in Shaw v. Delta
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ERISA preempts all state laws insofar as they "relate to" such
plans,"0 thereby "establish[ing] pension plan regulation as exclu-
Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 (1983).
10. ERISA's preemption provision provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subthapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supercede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b)
of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the breadth of ERISA's
preemption provision. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1987)
("the express pre-emption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive"); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) ("The pre-emption provision was
intended to displace all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are
consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements."). But cf Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987) (ERISA preempts only state laws that relate to an "employee
benefit plan" as opposed to state laws that relate merely to an "employee benefit"). Further,
the Supreme Court has "broadly construed the words 'relate to' in order to give proper effect
to the preemption language of ERISA." Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1293
(5th Cir. 1989); see Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) ("A law 'relates
to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan." (footnote omitted)).
Given "the breadth of the preemption clause[,1 . ..state laws found to be beyond [its]
...scope . . . are few." Jackson v. Martin Marietta Corp., 805 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th Cir.
1986). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated that "[s]ome state actions may affect em-
ployee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that
the law 'relates to' the plan." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21 (citing American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that ERISA does not preempt a state court
order to garnish ERISA pension benefits to satisfy court-ordered child support or alimony
payments)). For cases holding that a particular state law affects employee benefit plans in too
tenuous, remote and peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law "relates to" such
plans, see, e.g., Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 161-62 (6th Cir. 1989) (em-
ployees' state law claims against employer for fraud, misrepresentation and promissory estop-
pel based on allegation that employer fraudulently induced employees' participation in an em-
ployee benefit plan), cert. denied, U.S. __ , 110 S. Ct. 1166 (1990); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1989) (Connecticut's escheat law), cert. denied,
__ U.S. ., 110 S. Ct. 57 (1989); Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing
Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1470 (5th Cir. 1986) (state common law of
corporate fiduciary duty), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 & 1089 (1987); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749
F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1984) (state statute establishing hospital rates chargeable to employee
benefit plans), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985); Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th
Cir. 1984) (state employment anti-discrimination law); Greenblatt v. Budd Co., 666 F. Supp.
735, 741-42 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (employee's state common law claim for misrepresentation
against employer based upon "employer's promise to provide the plaintiff with certain benefits
at some unknown time in the future," id. at 742); Morningstar v. Meijer, Inc., 662 F. Supp.
555, 556-57 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (employee's state law claim against employer for breach of
employment contract and seeking damages including "the value of future fringe benefits she
would have received had her employment continued," id. at 556).
An express exception to ERISA's preemption provision is found in the "saving clause"
which excepts from preemption "any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982). The saving clause is, in turn, qualified by the
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"deemer clause" which states:
Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such
a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank,
trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insur-
ance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate
insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies.
Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
In Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. 724 (1985), the Supreme Court read the saving clause and
the deemer clause together as subjecting insured employee benefit plans to indirect regulation
by state laws that "regulate insurance." The Court held, however, that uninsured employee
benefit plans (also referred to in the case law as "self-insured" or "self-funded" plans) are not
subject to such regulation. The Court stated:
We are aware that our decision results in a distinction between insured and
uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation while the latter
are not. By so doing we merely give life to a distinction created by Congress in
the "deemer clause," a distinction Congress is aware of and one it has chosen
not to alter.
Id. at 747 (footnote omitted); see also Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d
416, 418, 425 (7th Cir.) ("[Sltate laws arguably 'regulating insurance' are preempted by
ERISA as to self-insured plans." Id. at 418. However, "[i]f a plan purchases insurance, as
opposed to being self-insured, it is 'directly affected by state laws that regulate the insurance
industry.' " Id. at 425 (quoting Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 732)), cert. denied, - U.S.
-,109 S. Ct. 145 (1988); Moore v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922,
927 (9th Cir. 1986); Children's Hosp. v. Whitcomb, 778 F.2d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 1985); El-
lington v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 696 F. Supp. 1237, 1243 (S.D. Ind. 1988). But see
Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
even if the state statute in question is a law which "regulates insurance," it is not saved from
preemption by ERISA as to an insured plan), cert. denied, - U.S .... 109 S. Ct. 3216
(1989); Northern Group Servs., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85, 90-95 (6th Cir.
1987) (holding that a state law which "regulates insurance" is saved from preemption as to a
self-insured (uninsured) plan when "there is no demonstrated interest in national uniformity
and preemption of state law would substantially disrupt a state regulatory scheme generally
applicable to both insured and self-insured ERISA plans, as well as to insurers generally," id.
at 95), cert. denied sub nom. Northern Group Servs., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
486 U.S. 1017 (1988); Rasmussen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 675 F. Supp. 1497, 1503
(W.D. La. 1987) ("the necessity of the insured/uninsured distinction has been cast in serious
doubt by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pilot Life").
To determine whether a state law "regulates insurance" within the meaning of the saving
clause the Supreme Court has instructed courts to take what guidance is available from "a
'commmon-sense view' of the language of the saving clause itself," Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 48,
and to make use of "the case law interpreting the phrase 'business of insurance' under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1101-et seq .... " Id. Further, courts are to consider
the exclusivity of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. Id. at 51-52.
Cases construing the saving clause and the deemer clause are collected and discussed at
Annotation, Construction and Application of Preemption Exemption, Under Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (29 USCS §§ 1001 et seq.), for State Laws Regulating Insurance,
Banking, or Securities (29 USCS § 1144(bX2)), 87 A.L.R. FED. 797 (1988).
For commentary on ERISA preemption, see Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Pre-emption:
A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427 (1987); Irish & Cohen, ERISA
Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 109 (1985);
Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis
of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1313 (1984).
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sively a federal concern."' 1
Although designed primarily to regulate employee pension
plans, ERISA also governs employee welfare benefit plans.12 Such
plans are defined in ERISA to include any employer-sponsored plan,
fund, or program designed to provide employees and their benefi-
ciaries with "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits ....""
11. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981) (footnote omitted).
"Representative Dent described the 'reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate
the field of employee benefit plans' as ERISA's 'crowning achievement.' " Pilot Life, 481 U.S.
at 46 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent)).
12. Oversight Hearing on Employee Welfare Benefit Plans: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Comm. on Education and Labor on H.R.
5475, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 23 (1984) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of Robert
A.G. Monks, Administrator, Office of Pension and Welfare Benefit Plans, U.S. Dept. of La-
bor) ("Although ERISA is thought of as being preeminently involved with pensions ... it is
also significant in its impact on welfare plans"); see also id. at 8 (prepared statement of M.
Diane Dwight, Esq., Provost, Umphrey, Doyle & McPherson, Port Arthur, Tex.) ("While
the primary aim of [ERISA] as it was finally passed was protection of pension benefits, it is
equally true that many sought security and safeguards for welfare benefits as well"). See gen-
erally Clark, ERISA's Application to Fringe Benefits Other Than Pension Plans, 12 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 330 (1986).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982).
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any
plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unem-
ployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or
day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit
described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on retirement or
death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1 (1988) (Dept. of Labor regulations further defining what
does and does not constitute an "employee welfare benefit plan" for purposes of ERISA).
It has generally been held that five elements comprise the definition of a welfare plan:
(1) a "plan, fund or program" (2) established or maintained (3) by an employer
or by an employee organization, or by both, (4) for the purpose of providing
medical, surgical, hospital care, sickness, accident, disability, death, unemploy-
ment or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, day care
centers, scholarship funds, prepaid legal services or severance benefits (5) to the
participants or their beneficiaries.
Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Dono-
van v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1371 (l1th Cir. 1982) (en banc)), cert. denied, - U.S.
- 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989).
For cases addressing the issue of what constitutes an "employee welfare benefit plan" for
purposes of ERISA, see, e.g., Massachusetts v. Morash, __ U.S. - , - , 109 S. Ct.
1668, 1672 (1989) (an employer's policy of paying discharged employees for unused vacation
time does not constitute an "employee welfare benefit plan"); Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11-19 (1987) (to qualify as a plan there must exist an ongoing administra-
tive program or scheme for processing claims, paying benefits and generally meeting the em-
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Thus, employee health care plans-the focus of this article-are a
type of employee welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA.
Unlike ERISA's heavy regulation of employee pension plans,"'
its regulation of employee welfare benefit plans is very limited. 5
"[T]he only statutory requirements imposed upon employee welfare
benefit plans are the reporting and disclosure requirements of Part I
and the fiduciary responsibility standards of Part IV."' 6 ERISA's
participation, vesting, and funding standards are inapplicable to em-
ployee welfare benefit plans.' Ironically, despite ERISA's limited
ployer's obligations); Belasco v. W.K.P. Wilson & Sons, Inc., 833 F.2d 277, 280 (11th Cir.
1987) ("We conclude that the insurance policies in this case constitute a 'plan' as defined by
ERISA, although we note with concern that this portends a dramatic increase in the federal
court system's case load." (footnotes omitted)); Ed Miniat, Inc. v. Globe Life Ins. Group, Inc.,
805 F.2d 732, 738-41 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987); Wisconsin Educ.
Ass'n Ins. Trust v. Iowa State Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 804 F.2d 1059, 1061-65 (8th Cir.
1986); Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1144-46 (4th Cir. 1985), summarily
affd sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1986); Matthew 25 Minis-
tries, Inc. v. Corcoran, 771 F.2d 21, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1985); California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning,
770 F.2d 856, 858-62 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 783 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 904 (1986); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc. 765 F.2d 320, 324-26 (2d Cir. 1985),
summarily aff'd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502-04 (9th
Cir. 1985); Taggart Corp. v. Life and Health Benefits Admin., Inc., 617 F.2d 1208, 1210-12
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Taggart v. Efros, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Wayne Chem-
ical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692, 698-700 (7th Cir. 1977); Davis v.
Time Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 1317, 1318-21 (S.D. Miss. 1988); Ellington v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 696 F. Supp. 1237, 1239-40 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Dodd v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 688 F. Supp. 564, 566-68 (E.D. Cal. 1988); Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 9 EBC 1482, 1484-89 (D. Mass. 1987); National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 602 F. Supp.
232, 235-37 (N.D. 11. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 784 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1986); Insur-
ance & Prepaid Benefits Trusts v. Marshall, 90 F.R.D. 703, 704-07 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Bell v.
Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 388-96 (D. Kan. 1977); Hamberlin v. VIP
Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196, 1197-1200 (D. Ariz. 1977); Golden Bear Family Restaurants,
Inc. v. Murray, 144 Il1. App. 3d 616, 621-25, 494 N.E.2d 581, 584-87 (1986).
The practitioner should be aware that ERISA's "Coverage" provision expressly excludes
certain types of employee benefit plans from ERISA's coverage. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)
(1982). The "Coverage" provision also sets out certain criteria that must be met before an
employee benefit plan will fall within ERISA's coverage. See id. § 1003(a).
14. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
15. See generally Oversight Hearing, supra note 12, at 19 (prepared statement of Rob-
ert A.G. Monks, Administrator, Office of Pension and Welfare Benefit Plans, U.S. Dept. of
Labor) (describing the lack of standards established by Congress for welfare plans as compared
to pension plans, and the "primarily archival" role of the Dept. of Labor with regard to
welfare plans).
16. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d 1307, 1311
(9th Cir. 1982) (Tang, J., dissenting), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
17. Hansen v. White Motor Corp. (In re White Farm Equip. Co.), 788 F.2d 1186,
1191 (6th Cir. 1986) ("There is an express statutory exclusion of welfare plans from the
stringent minimum vesting, participation, and funding standards imposed on pension plans
.... "); Oversight Hearing, supra note 12, at 19 (prepared statement of Robert A.G. Monks,
Administrator, Office of Pension and Welfare Benefit Plans, U.S. Dept. of Labor) ("[Tihe
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regulation of employee welfare benefit plans, Congress chose-as it
did with respect to the more heavily-regulated employee pension
plans' 8-to preempt all state laws insofar as they "relate to" such
plans, 9 thereby making employee welfare benefit plan regulation an
exclusively federal concern. "Thus, ERISA, without providing any
guidance, governs all forms of health and medical benefits provided
by employers and, at the same time, eliminates all state laws that
affect employee health benefits."2
Because ERISA preempts all state laws insofar as they "relate
to" ERISA-governed employee health care plans, a plaintiff seeking
to assert a cause of action against such a plan 21 must generally look
to ERISA's civil enforcement provisions22 rather than to state law. 28
Congress did not extend the minimum participation, vesting and funding standards established
for pensions to private employer welfare benefit plans."); Perkins, ERISA Preemption Affect-
ing Indigent Health Care Coverage, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1506, 1507 (Apr. 1987)
("Employee welfare benefit plans ... are covered only by reporting, disclosure and fiduciary
standards. Funding, termination and participation standards are not included. And the admin-
istrative agency primarily in charge, the Department of Labor, has not actively moved to regu-
late ERISA health plans.").
18. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
19. ERISA's preemption provision provides for the preemption of "all State laws insofar
as they ...relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and
not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
The term "employee benefit plan" is defined in ERISA to include both pension and welfare
plans. See id. § 1002(3). Thus, ERISA's preemption provision applies to welfare plans. For a
thorough discussion of ERISA's preemption provision, see supra note 10.
20. Dudovitz, Health Insurance and ERISA: An Update, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1415, 1415 (Mar. 1987).
21. Section 1132(d)(1) of ERISA provides in part that "[an employee benefit plan may
sue or be sued under this subchapter as an entity." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1) (1982).
22. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of ERISA's civil en-
forcement provisions.
23. See, e.g., Keel v. Group Hospitalization Medical Servs., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 223, 227
(E.D. Va. 1988) (since plaintiffs' state law claims are preempted by ERISA, "[sihe only rem-
edy available to the plaintiffs must ... derive from those provided in ERISA" (footnote
omitted)).
In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987), the Supreme Court adopted the
Solicitor General's view that
Congress clearly expressed an intent that the civil enforcement provisions of
ERISA § 502(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] be the exclusive vehicle for actions by
ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of a
claim for benefits, and that varying state causes of action for claims within the
scope of § 502(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] would pose an obstacle to the pur-
poses and objectives of Congress.
Id. at 52 (emphasis added); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-63
(1987) ("[A] suit by a beneficiary to recover benefits from a covered plan ...falls directly
under § 502(a)(1)(B) (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)[ of ERISA, which provides an exclusive
federal cause of action for resolution of such disputes" (emphasis added)). But see H.R. REP.
No. 801, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 63 (1988) (the Committee on Education and Labor
1990] ERISA
If ERISA's civil enforcement provisions do not provide the plaintiff
with a cause of action, the plaintiff is left unprotected under both
state and federal law, and is effectively denied all access to the courts
to redress its grievance against the plan. This situation has raised
concerns on the part of health care providers that render services to
individuals covered by ERISA-governed employee health care plans.
Unless ERISA's civil enforcement provisions provide health care
providers with a cause of action against such plans they will be un-
protected under both state 4 and federal law and will be forced "to
disagrees with the Supreme Court's conclusion in Pilot Life "that ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions under section 502 were intended to be the exclusive remedies afforded to plan par-
ticipants and beneficiaries" and "believes that the legislative history of ERISA and subsequent
expansions of ERISA support the view that Congress intended for the courts to develop a
Federal common law with respect to employee benefit plans, including the development of
appropriate remedies, even if they are not specifically enumerated in section 502 of ERISA").
The Supreme Court in Pilot Life went on to hold that the plaintiff-employee's state com-
mon law claims for tortious breach of contract (referred to in the plaintiff's brief to the Su-
preme Court and in the Supreme Court's opinion as the Mississippi common law of bad
faith), breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud in the inducement, Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43, each
based on an alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits, were preempted by ERISA.
Id. at 57. For commentary on the Pilot Life decision, see, e.g., Chittenden, ERISA Preemp-
tion: The Demise of Bad Faith Actions In Group Insurance Cases, 12 S. ILL. U.L.J. 517
(1988); Note, Blind Faith Conquers Bad Faith: Only Congress Can Save Us After Pilot Life
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1343 (1988).
In Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. 58 (1987), the Supreme Court expanded on its decision in
Pilot Life, holding that state common law claims asserting improper processing of a claim for
benefits "are not only pre-empted by ERISA, but also displaced by ERISA's civil enforcement
provision, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), to the extent that complaints filed in
state courts purporting to plead such state common law causes of action are removable to
federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)." Id. at 60 (footnote omitted). The Court concluded:
"Accordingly, this suit, though it purports to raise only state law claims, is necessarily federal
in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of Congress. It, therefore, 'arisels] under
the . . . laws . . . of the United States,' 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is removable to federal court
by the defendants, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)." Id. at 67.
Thus, Metropolitan Life extends the "Avco exception" to the well-pleaded complaint rule
to situations where a plaintiff files a complaint in state court asserting only state law claims
that are preempted by section 1144(a) of ERISA and that fall within the scope of section
1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. In such a case, the state law claims are displaced by section
1132(a)(1)(B) and "recharacterized" as claims arising under that section, thereby making the
action removable to federal court despite the fact that the complaint on its face makes reference
only to state law. Id. at 63-67; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. The 65 Sec. Plan, 879 F.2d 90, 93
(3d Cir. 1989) (discussing the two circumstances that must be present for Avco or the "com-
plete preemption" doctrine to apply); Aaron v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 1157,
1161-63 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing the Avco exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule),
cert. denied sub nom. American Home Ins. Group v. Aaron,__ U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1121
(1990). See generally Comment, The Evolving Concept of Preemption Removal: An Expan-
sion of Federal Jurisdiction, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 189 (1988).
24. The preemption principles enunciated in Pilot Life, 481 U.S. 41 (1987), have been
held to apply where the plaintiff asserting the state law claims is a health care provider. See
Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1988)
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evaluate the solvency of patients before commencing medical treat-
(hospital's state common law claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, equitable estop-
pel, breach of contract and fraud preempted); Stormont-Vail Regional Medical Center v. Kan-
sas Bldg. Trades Open-End Health Care and Welfare Fund Uninsured Benefit Plan, No. 88-
4146 (D. Kan. Jan. 8, 1990) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1990 WL 11377) (pro-
vider's state law claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, estoppel and waiver pre-
empted); Albert Einstein Medical Center v. National Benefit Fund for Hosp. and Health Care
Employees, No. 89-5931 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1989
WL 156374) ("the provisions of ERISA preempt plaintiffs' third party beneficiary claims
against the Fund"); Health Scan, Ltd. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 268, 270 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (provider's promissory estoppel claim preempted); Farber v. Billiot, No. 89-3634 (E.D.
La. Sept. 28, 1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1989 WL 113560) (provider's
claims under Louisiana's claims processing statute preempted); Multicare Health Care Servs.,
Inc. v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 720 F. Supp. 581, 582 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (provider's claim
under Texas Insurance Code provision regulating unfair and deceptive insurance practices
preempted); Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 684 F. Supp. 1352, 1356-60 (E.D. La. 1988)
(provider's cause of action under Louisiana's claims processing statute preempted); D'Onofrio
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 662 F. Supp. 872, 874 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (provider's state common law
breach of contract claim for failure to pay benefits preempted); H.C.A. Health Servs., Inc. v.
Blue Cross Ins. Co., No. 87-2348 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 1987) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS
Database, 1987 WL 17323) (provider's cause of action under Louisiana's claims processing
statute preempted); Providence Hosp. v. National Labor Union Health & Welfare Fund, 162
Mich. App. 191, 195-200, 412 N.W.2d 690, 692-94 (1987) (provider's state common law
contract claim for failure to pay benefits preempted); see also Misic v. Building Serv. Employ-
ees Health and Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir.) (provider's state law tort claims
and statutory claim for unfair business practices in violation of section 790.03 of the California
Insurance Code preempted); DePaul Hosp. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 487 So. 2d 143, 146 (La.
Ct. App.) (provider's State law claim for negligent disclosure preempted), writ denied, 492 So.
2d 1218 (La. 1986). See generally Kennedy v. Deere & Co., 118 11. 2d 69, 75, 514 N.E.2d
171, 174 (1987) ("[Slection 514(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)] of ERISA . . . would prohibit an
assignee [health care provider] from acting under State law to establish a legal claim to benefits
under a plan"), affg 142 I1. App. 3d 781, 492 N.E.2d 199 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1064 (1988). But see Albert Einstein Medical Center v. National Benefit Fund for Hosp. and
Health Care Employees, No. 89-5931 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS
Database, 1989 WL 156374) (provider's state law claims for breach of contract, unjust enrich-
ment, quantum meruit and promissory estoppel not preempted "to the extent that plaintiffs are
claiming an independent right to payment, apart from the terms of the plan"); Albert Einstein
Medical Center v. Action Mfg. Co., 697 F. Supp. 883, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (provider's state
law estoppel claim not preempted); HCA Health Servs., Inc. v. Catrambone, 682 F. Supp.
381, 383 (N.D. 11. 1988) (provider's state law estoppel claim not preempted), memnorandun
and order denying reconsideration, No. 87 C 947 (N.D. IIl. Apr. 5, 1988) (WESTLAW,
ALLFEDS Database, 1988 WL 33841).
The removal principles enunciated in Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. 58 (1987), have also
been held to apply where the plaintiff is a health care provider. See, e.g., Farber v. Billiot, No.
89-3634 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1989 WL 113560);
Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of New York, 684 F. Supp. 1352, 1359 (E.D. La. 1988);
D'Onofrio v. Travelers Ins. Co., 662 F. Supp. 872, 873-74 (E.D. Ark. 1987). In D'Onofrio
the court stated:
The plaintiff here, an assignee of the beneficiary of an ERISA regulated
plan, has sued on a common law breach of contract theory for alleged failure of
the Travelers to pay sums due under the plan. Necessarily this claim is within
the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme, specifically 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)
(1)(B), and therefore is a suit arising under the laws of the United States. Met-
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ment"25 and, ultimately, to refuse treatment to those individuals in-
capable of paying for services through sources other than the em-
.ployee health care plan.
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions are found in section
1132(a) of ERISA.2 Section 1132(a) "identifies six types of civil ac-
tions that may be brought"" under ERISA and "specifies which
persons-participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the Secretary of
Labor-may bring" 8 each type of action.29 One of the six types of
ropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, - U.S. at __, 107 S.Ct. at 1544.
As such, this case is properly removable to federal court. Id.
Id. at 874.
The D'Onofrio decision is questionable in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). In that case
the Supreme Court held, in effect, that a suit for relief under section 1132(a) of ERISA by a
plaintiff who lacks standing to sue under that section does not "arise under" that section. Id. at
27 ("ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled to seek relief under § 502 [29 U.S.C. §
1132]; it does not provide anyone other than participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an
express cause of action for a declaratory judgment on the issue in this case. A suit for similar
relief by some other party does not 'arise under' that provision." (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)). Thus, before a court can find that a plaintiff's state law claims are removable under
Metropolitan Life the court must first find that the plaintiff has standing to sue under section
1132(a) of ERISA. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. The 65 Sec. Plan, 879 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir.
1989) (state law claim of insurance company that lacked standing to sue under section 1132(a)
was improperly removed to federal court); Solomon v. Geraci, No. 89-8607 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19,
1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1989 WL 156372) (state law claims of health care
provider who lacked standing to sue under section 1132(a) of ERISA were improperly re-
moved to federal court); see also Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Action Mfg. Co., 697 F.
Supp. 883, 885 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (dicta) ("Congress and the Supreme Court view the civil
enforcement provisions as permitting removal only in suits that could be brought pursuant to
those provisions, which restrict private actions to plan beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or partici-
pants. . . . Hence, plaintiff's suit, which could not have been brought under ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions, is not of the type on which Congress seems to have intended to confer
the 'extraordinary preemptive power' of removal"). The D'Onofrio court did not consider
whether the plaintiff-health care provider had standing to sue under section 1132(a) before
concluding that his state law claims were removable to federal court. Therefore, removal under
Metropolitan Life may or may not have been proper in D'Onofrio.
25. Misic v. Building Serv. Employees Health and Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1377
(9th Cir. 1986).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982). See infra note 29 for the text of section 1132(a).
27. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1985).
28. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 25 (1983).
29. Section 1132(a) provides:
(a) A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appro-
priate relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or prac-
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civil actions identified in section 1132(a) is an action to recover bene-
fits due under an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan. This ac-
tion is specifically identified in section 1132(a)(1)(B) 0 and, accord-
ing to that section, may be asserted by a "participant" 1 or
"beneficiary. "82
This article addresses the issue of whether a health care pro-
vider that has rendered services to a participant or beneficiary in an
ERISA-governed employee health care plan has standing"3 to assert
the cause of action provided for in section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA,
either as a person expressly empowered by that section to sue,34 or
derivatively by virtue of an assignment of benefits. 8 This article also
addresses the issue of whether health care providers have standing to
sue under ERISA under the theory that the list of persons expressly
empowered by section 1132(a) of ERISA to sue is not exclusive, 6
tice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate
relief in the case of a violation of 1025(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the
Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter; or
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (i) of this
section.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982).
30. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). See supra note 29 for the text of section 1132(a)(1)(B).
31. The term "participant" is defined at section 1002(7) of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. §
1002(7) (1982). See infra text accompanying note 42 for the text of section 1002(7).
32. The term "beneficiary" is defined at section 1002(8) of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. §
1002(8) (1982). See infra text accompanying note 43 for the text of section 1002(8).
33. The term "standing" as used in this article refers to statutory standing. Statutory
standing refers to whether or not the statute itself precludes the plaintiffs suit. Note, ERISA:
To Sue or Not To Sue-A Question of Statutory Standing, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 239, 246
(1985) [hereinafter Note, ERISA: To Sue or Not To Sue]. Statutory standing should be distin-
guished from constitutional and prudential standing considerations. For a discussion of the
three types of standing, see id. at 243-46.
34. Specifically, the article addresses the issue of whether a health care provider can
qualify as a beneficiary as defined in section 1002(8) of ERISA. See infra notes 41-94 and
accompanying text (Section II.A. Persons Expressly Empowered by Section 1132(a) of ERISA
to Sue). If so, the health care provider would be expressly empowered to sue under section
1132(a)(1)(B).
35. Where a health care provider is assigned the benefits due a participant or benefi-
ciary in an ERISA-governed employee health care plan in exchange for services rendered, the
issue arises as to whether the health care provider, as the assignee of a person expressly em-
powered by section 1132(a)(1)(B) to sue, has standing, derivatively, to assert the claims of the
assignor in whose shoes it stands. See infra notes 95-177 and accompanying text (Section II.B.
Derivative Standing by Virtue of an Assignment of Benefits).
36. See infra notes 178-98 and accompanying text (Section II.C. Standing to Sue Under
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and the issue of whether benefits due a judgment-debtor under an
ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan are subject to gar-
nishment by the judgment-creditor.3 7
II. STANDING TO SUE UNDER ERISA
Standing to sue under ERISA has been found where: (1) the
plaintiff is a person expressly empowered by section 1132(a) of
ERISA to sue;38 (2) the plaintiff is the assignee of a person expressly
empowered by section 1132(a) of ERISA to sue, in which event the
plaintiff-assignee "stands in the shoes" of the assignor for purposes
of standing;39 or (3) the court finds that the list of persons expressly
the Theory That the List of Persons Expressly Empowered by Section 1132(a) of ERISA to
Sue is Not Exclusive).
37. See infra notes 199-228 and accompanying text (Section III. GARNISHMENT OF EM-
PLOYEE WELFARE BENEFITS).
38. See, e.g., Salomon v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 659, 660 (4th
Cir. 1986) (fiance of deceased employee had standing to sue under ERISA because she fell
"within the definition of beneficiary given in [29 U.S.C.] § 1002(8)" and was therefore "enti-
tled to bring an ERISA claim under [29 U.S.C.] § 1132(a)(1)"); Framingham Union Hosp.,
Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1478, 1486 (D. Mass. 1989) ("[T]he Hospital is a
fiduciary within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), and is therefore authorized to sue
under ERISA."); cf. Sladek v. Bell Sys. Management Pension Plan, 880 F.2d 972, 979 (7th
Cir. 1989) ("[T]he appellant has standing as a potential beneficiary within the meaning of 29
U.S.C. § 1002(8)" (emphasis added)).
39. See, e.g., Michael Reese Hosp. and Medical Center v. Solo Cup Employee Health
Benefit Plan, 899 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1990) (implicitly holding that hospital, as assignee of
participant or beneficiary, has standing to sue under ERISA); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA
Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (5th Cir. 1988) (health care provider, as
assignee of beneficiary, has derivative standing to sue plan under ERISA if assignment is
valid); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yampol, 840 F.2d 421, 423, 427 (7th Cir. 1988) (assignee of
fiduciary has standing to sue under ERISA); Misic v. Building Serv. Employees Health and
Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1986) (health care provider, as assignee of
beneficiary, has derivative standing to sue plan under ERISA); Stormont-Vail Regional Medi-
cal Center v. Kansas Bldg. Trades Open-End Health & Welfare Fund Uninsured Benefit
Plan, No. 88-4146 (D. Kan. Jan. 8, 1990) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1990 WL
11377) ("Stormont-Vail Regional Medical Center, as assignee of Dale Bieker, has standing to
assert the claims of its assignor"); H.C.A. Health Servs. v. American Thrift & Fin., No. 89-
2912 (E.D. La. Dec. 28, 1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1989 WL 159333)
("DePaul is an assignee of a participant or beneficiary under the plan and as such may bring
suit under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)"); Foster F. McGaw Hosp. of Loyola Univ. of Chicago v.
Building Material Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Welfare Fund of Chicago, Local 786,
No. 89 C 0044 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1989 WL
152616) ("As assignees, plaintiffs have standing to contest the trustees' decision to deny bene-
fits."); Farber v. Billiot, No. 89-3634 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS
Database, 1989 WL 113560) ("if Dr. Farber is a valid assignee of health benefits, he has
standing under ERISA"); St. Mary Medical Center v. Cristiano, 724 F. Supp. 732, 740 (C.D.
Cal. 1989) (provider, as assignee of benefits, has standing to sue under ERISA); Multicare
Health Care Servs., Inc. v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 720 F. Supp. 581, 582 (N.D. Tex.
1989) ("ERISA's civil enforcement provisions extend to assignees of benefits like Multicare.");
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empowered by section 1132(a) of ERISA to sue is not exclusive and
that the plaintiff has standing to sue under ERISA despite the fact
that the plaintiff is neither a person expressly empowered by section
1132(a) of ERISA to sue, nor the assignee of a person expressly
empowered by section 1132(a) of ERISA to sue.4
A. Persons Expressly Empowered by Section 1132(a) of ERISA to
Sue
As previously noted, section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA expressly
empowers participants and beneficiaries in an ERISA-governed em-
ployee benefit plan to sue the plan to recover benefits due under the
plan.41 ERISA defines the term "participant" to mean:
Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs. v. Upholsterers Int'l Union Health and Welfare
Fund, 686 F. Supp. 708, 713-14 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (state agency, as assignee of individuals
covered by ERISA health plan, has standing to sue under ERISA); H.C.A. Health Servs., Inc.
v. Blue Cross Ins. Co., No. 87-2348 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 1987) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS
Database, 1987 WL 17323) (health care provider, as assignee of participant, has standing to
sue plan under ERISA); Kennedy v. Deere & Co., 142 Ill. App. 3d 781, 785-87, 492 N.E.2d
199, 202-03 (1986) (health care provider, as assignee of participant or beneficiary, has deriva-
tive standing to sue plan under ERISA), aff'd, 118 Ill. 2d 69, 514 N.E.2d 171 (1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988); see also Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund v.
Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 167 (3d Cir. 1985) (Fullam, J.,
concurring) ("Where the entitlements of an identifiable beneficiary are at issue, the federal
courts are open to litigation under 28 [sic] U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), I suggest, regardless of
whether the action is maintained in the name of the beneficiary, or in the name of a personal
representative, assignee or subrogee"). But see id. at 154 n.6 (majority opinion) (questioning
Judge Fullam's conclusion "that there is jurisdiction in this case under 28 [sic] U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B) because the ILGWU fund is the 'assignee or subrogee' of Mrs. Fazio" and
expressing "serious doubts whether she could assign along with her substantive rights her right
to sue in federal court"); Health Scan, Ltd. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D.
Pa. 1989) ("standing under ERISA does not extend to assignees of plan benefits" (citing
Northeast Dep't ILGWU)); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund,
695 F. Supp. 181, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("Section.1 132(a)(1)(B) does not extend to assignees of
ERISA benefits" (citing Northeast Dep't ILGWU)).
In Albert Einstein Medical Center v. National Benefit Fund for Hosp. and Health Care
Employees, No. 89-5931 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1989
WL 156374) the court, relying on the above line of cases, found that a health care provider
had standing to sue under ERISA under a "third-party beneficiary" theory based on a provi-
sion in the plan which provided: "The Fund will pay the hospital directly for all services
covered by the plan."
40. See, e.g., Fentron Indus., Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300,
1305 (9th Cir. 1982) (employer has standing to sue under ERISA despite fact that employers
are not included in the list of persons expressly empowered by section 1132(a) of ERISA to
sue because, for among other reasons, "[t]here is nothing in the legislative history to suggest
either that the list of parties empowered to sue under this section is exclusive or that Congress
intentionally omitted employers").
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1982). See supra note 29 for the text of section
1132(a)(1)(B).
ERISA
[Any employee or former employee of an employer, or any
member or former member of an employee organization, who is
or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an
employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer
or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be
eligible to receive any such benefit.42
The term "beneficiary" means "a person designated by a participant,
or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become
entitled to a benefit thereunder."4 Absent unusual circumstances, a
health care provider will not qualify as a participant under
ERISA.44 Thus, the issue becomes whether, and under what circum-
stances, a health care provider can qualify as a beneficiary under
ERISA. This issue has been addressed by two courts. The first court
to address the issue was the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania in Cameron Manor, Inc. v.
United Mine Workers of America."
1. Cameron Manor, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America
In Cameron a nursing care facility sued an ERISA-governed
employee health care plan to recover benefits due under the plan for
services rendered to plan participants. The nursing care facility
"contend[ed] that it [had been] tacitly designated a beneficiary by the
employee-patients by their selection of the facility for treatment."'46
The court rejected this contention, and concluded that as a matter of
law a health care provider can never qualify as a beneficiary under
ERISA. The court stated:
"Beneficiary" in the context of the various provisions of
ERISA carries the connotation of a person, other than the em-
ployee-participant, who is covered by the plan's provi-
sions-e.g., a spouse or dependent. Furthermore, the act of
"designation" would appear to be such formal election as that
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1982).
43. Id. § 1002(8).
44. See Albert Einstein Medical Center v. National Benefit Fund for Hosp. and Health
Care Employees, No. 89-5931 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database,
1989 WL 156374) ("It is clear that the hospitals in the present case do not qualify as 'partici-
pants' under the ERISA statutory definition"); Pritt v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., 699
F. Supp. 81, 84 (S.D. W. Va. 1988) ("Neither party seriously contends that the Plaintiff
[health care provider] is a 'participant' within the meaning of the statute"); Cameron Manor,
Inc. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 575 F. Supp. 1243, 1245 (W.D. Pa. 1983) ("Plaintiff
[nursing care facility] is clearly not a 'participant' as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7)").
45. 575 F. Supp. 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
46. Id. at 1245.
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contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1055, rather than the patient's choice
of facility. Finally, the declared purpose of the Act is to protect
and educate those persons covered by such plans, and there is no
indication that Congress intended by this statute to insure that
health care facilities be paid. While Plaintiff may indeed be en-
titled to a "benefit" through operation of the plan-i.e., pay-
ment for services-we conclude that the term as employed in
the statute does not permit of a construction broad enough to
include a provider of health services to participants."'
The Cameron court's reasoning is highly questionable for sev-
eral reasons. First, the court's statement that the term
" '[b]eneficiary' in the context of the various provisions of ERISA
carries the connotation of a person, other than the employee-partici-
pant, who is covered by the plan's provisions-e.g., a spouse or de-
pendent" '48 indicates that the court was of the opinion that in order
to qualify as a beneficiary under ERISA one must be: (1) a natural
person, and (2) "covered by the plan's provisions." '49 The court's
view that only natural persons can qualify as beneficiaries under
ERISA is erroneous. Specifically, the court failed to consider
ERISA's definition of the term "person." The term "person," as
used in ERISA generally, and in ERISA's definition of the term
"beneficiary" 50 specifically, is broadly defined in section 1002(9) of
ERISA to include "an individual, partnership, joint venture, corpo-
ration, mutual company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unincor-
porated organization, association, or employee organization. '
Clearly, then, a non-natural person such as a nursing care facility or
hospital can qualify as a beneficiary under ERISA. Moreover, since
non-natural persons can qualify as beneficiaries under ERISA, it
follows that a person need not be "covered by the plan's provi-
47. Id. at 1245-46.
48. Id. at 1245.
49. Id.
50. "The term 'beneficiary' means a person designated by a participant, or by the terms
of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." 29
U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1982) (emphasis added).
51. Id. § 1002(9).
[A] straightforward reading of the "person" definition shows it simply follows
the theme common to a great many statutes: To save a constant repetition of
terms in the substantive parts of the legislation, the draftsmen use a generic
term ("person") throughout those substantive sections and then give that term
its content in the definitions part of the statute. Section 1002(9) makes plain
that all manner of entities, and not just the individual human beings commonly
denoted by the term "person," are meant to be covered by the legislation.




sions"52 in the sense envisioned by the Cameron court in order to
qualify as a beneficiary under ERISA. Presumably, for a person to
-be "covered by the plan's provisions' 53 in the sense envisioned by the
Cameron court the plan must be contractually obligated to pay for
specified medical services rendered to the person. Obviously, since
non-natural persons do not require health care they will never be
"covered by the plan's provisions' 54 in that sense. Nevertheless, as
discussed above, non-natural persons can clearly qualify as benefi-
ciaries under ERISA. It follows, then, that being "covered by the
plan's provisions" 55 in the sense envisioned by the Cameron court is
not a prerequisite to qualifying as a beneficiary under ERISA.
Second, the Cameron court's statement that "the act of 'designa-
tion' would appear to be such formal election as that contained in 29
U.S.C. § 1055, rather than the patient's choice of facility"56 is with-
out foundation. It need only be noted that section 1055 is wholly
inapplicable to employee welfare benefit plans such as the health
care plan at issue in Cameron.51 Therefore, section 1055 is of no
assistance in determining the manner in which a participant in such
a plan may "designate" a person as a beneficiary. In fact, ERISA is
silent on the question of the manner in which a participant in an
ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan may "designate" a
person as a beneficiary. Therefore, courts must look beyond the stat-
ute to determine the manner in which a participant in an ERISA-
governed employee welfare benefit plan may "designate" a person as
a beneficiary.58





57. Section 1051(1) of ERISA provides: "This part shall apply to any employee benefit
plan described in section 1003(a) of this title (and not exempted under section 1003(b) of this
title) other than-(1) an employee welfare benefit plan .... " 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1982)
(emphasis added). Section 1055 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1055) falls within the "part" referred
to in section 1051(1). Therefore, section 1055 does not apply to welfare plans.
58. One way that a participant in an ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan
might be able to designate a person as a beneficiary is by following the procedure set out in the
plan itself. See, e.g., Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897
F.2d 275, 277 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("The Plan specifies how a participant may designate
a beneficiary"). Another way that a participant in an ERISA-governed employee welfare ben-
efit plan might designate a person as a beneficiary is by executing an assignment of benefits
form naming the person as the assignee. See Kennedy v. Deere & Co., 118 Ill. 2d 69, 514
N.E.2d 171 (1987) (assignment of benefits form naming health care provider as assignee of
participant's benefits constitutes "designation" by participant of health care provider as benefi-
ciary), aff'g 142 11. App. 3d 781, 492 N.E.2d 199 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988).
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Third, the Cameron court's statement that "the declared pur-
pose of the Act is to protect and educate those persons covered by
such plans, and there is no indication that Congress intended by this
statute to insure that health care facilities be paid ' 6 9 is internally
inconsistent. If ERISA is construed as not providing health care
providers with a statutory cause of action and, at the same time, as
preempting any state law claims that they might otherwise have,60
then health care providers, being unprotected under both state and
federal law, would have to refuse to treat "persons covered by such
plans"61 unless they are capable of paying for services through
sources other than the plan. If health care providers are forced to
refuse to treat "persons covered by such plans,"6 then the "declared
purpose of the Act" 6 -"to protect . . . persons covered by such
plans" 64-will be defeated.
Fourth, the Cameron court's statement that "Plaintiff may in-
deed be entitled to a 'benefit' through operation of the plan-i.e.,
payment for services" 6 would arguably bring the plaintiff squarely
For a thorough discussion of the Kennedy decision, see infra notes 77-87 and accompanying
text. The lower appellate court in Kennedy suggested that a participant might also designate a
person as beneficiary by executing a writing authorizing payment of the benefits directly to the
person. The lower appellate court observed that the employee-patients had completed forms,
separate and apart from the assignment forms, authorizing payment directly to the health care
providers. See Kennedy, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 492 N.E.2d at 201 (quoting from the assign-
ment form and the authorization-to-pay form). The lower appellate court stated:
Defendant's challenge to the assignment/authorizations-to-pay forms on
grounds that they are not "formal designations" is not well taken. In Cameron
Manor, the court contrasted the "formality" of an act of beneficiary "designa-
tion" to plaintiff's theory that by choosing to be treated at the plaintiff facility,
defendant's employees "tacitly" transferred their right to claim benefits due
under the defendant's health care plan. Under the Cameron Manor fact pattern
there was no showing of any purposeful act performed by the plan participants
or beneficiaries to transfer their right to claim benefits due for the services ren-
dered by the provider. In contrast to Cameron Manor it is uncontested that
plaintiffs here allege "formal," purposeful acts of executing two forms specifi-
cally drafted for the purpose of transferring to plaintiffs the right to claim bene-
fits due and to receive them directly from the defendant's health care plan. No
greater "formality" is required.
d. at 786, 492 N.E.2d at 203 (emphasis added); see also infra note 94 (discussion of Her-
mann Hospital case: participant's "authorization" to pay benefits directly to health care pro-
vider arguably constitutes "designation" of health care provider as beneficiary).
59. Cameron, 575 F. Supp. at 1245-46.
60. ERISA has been construed as preempting the state law claims of health care provid-
ers as against ERISA-governed employee health care plans. See cases cited at supra note 24.




65. Id. at 1246.
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within ERISA's definition of the term "beneficiary." Section 1002(8)
of ERISA defines the term "beneficiary" to include "a person desig-
nated . . . by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may
become entitled to a benefit thereunder." 66 Typically, the "benefit"
that an employee health care plan provides is payment for medical
services rendered;6 7 the benefit is not the rendition of medical ser-
vices.68 Thus, an individual or entity who, by virtue of a provision in
the plan, is or may become entitled to payment for medical services
rendered is a beneficiary as defined in section 1002(8) of ERISA
because the individual or entity "is or may become entitled to a ben-
efit"69 under the terms of the plan.° Since the nursing care facility
in Cameron may have been "entitled to a 'benefit' through operation
of the plan-i.e., payment for services,""' it seems clear that it fell
squarely within ERISA's definition of the term beneficiary. More-
over, the fact that the nursing care facility in Cameron did not incur
the medical expenses that caused the payment to become due under
the plan is immaterial. This is so for at least two reasons. First,
there is nothing in section 1002(8)'s definition of the term "benefi-
ciary" to suggest that the person entitled to payment for medical ser-
66. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1982) (emphasis added); see MacLean v. Ford Motor Co.,
831 F.2d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that the term beneficiary as defined in section
1002(8) of ERISA includes one designated " 'by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is
or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder' " (emphasis in original) (quoting section
1002(8))); Chambers v. Kaleidoscope, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan and Trust, 650 F. Supp. 359,
366 (N.D. Ga. 1986) ("[A] 'beneficiary' is defined as a person 'who is or may become entitled
to a benefit' under such a plan." (quoting section 1002(8))).
67. Kennedy v. Deere & Co., 118 Ill. 2d 69, 74, 514 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1987) ("It is to
be observed that under the defendant's plan the 'benefits' the participant is entitled to are
limited to payments for medical care under the plan."), affg 142 I1. App. 3d 781, 492 N.E.2d
199 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988); see also R.M. Bowler Contract Hauling Co.,
Inc. v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 547 F. Supp. 783, 784
(S.D. I1. 1982) ("Although the word 'benefit' is not specifically defined in ERISA, it is used
.. . to mean traditional fringe benefits to which employees are entitled, such as medical, disa-
bility, unemployment and vacation benefits."); Hibernia Bank v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 411 F. Supp. 478, 489 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
("The benefits to which a beneficiary must be entitled are, in general, 'fringe benefits' such as
medical disability and vacation payments.").
68. Kennedy, 118 Il1. 2d at 74, 514 N.E.2d at 173 ("The defendant is not obligated
contractually to provide the medical care but only to pay for it").
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1982).
70. For an example of a plan provision that arguably entitles a health care provider to
payment for medical services rendered, see Albert Einstein Medical Center v. National Benefit
Fund for Hosp. and Health Care Employees, No. 89-5931 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1989)
(WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1989 WL 156374) (plan contained the following provi-
sion: "The Fund will pay the hospital directly for all services covered by the plan"); see also
the discussion of the Herinann Hospital case at supra note 94.
71. Cameron, 575 F. Supp. at 1246.
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vices rendered (the "benefit") must be the person to whom the ser-
vices were rendered. Second, as has been discussed, non-natural
persons can qualify as beneficiaries under ERISA. Since non-natural
persons can qualify as beneficiaries under ERISA, and since non-
natural persons will never incur medical expenses as a result of hav-
ing received medical treatment, it follows that incurring the medical
expenses that cause the payment to become due under the plan is not
a prerequisite to qualifying as a beneficiary under ERISA.
Finally, the Cameron court's statement that "the term [benefi-
ciary] as employed in the statute does not permit of a construction
broad enough to include a provider of health services to partici-
pants"72 is simply erroneous. As already noted, the term "person" as
used in ERISA's definition of the term "beneficiary" is broadly de-
fined in section 1002(9) of ERISA to include "an individual, part-
nership, joint venture, corporation, mutual company, joint-stock
company, trust estate, unincorporated organization, association, or
employee organization. '7  Therefore, the term "beneficiary" as de-
fined in section 1002(8) of ERISA obviously "permit[s] of a con-
struction broad enough to include a provider of health services to
participants."' As noted by the Illinois Supreme Court in Kennedy
72. Id.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) (1982); see also supra note 51 (quotation from the Gambino
case).
74. Cameron, 575 F. Supp. at 1246.
The Cameron court's reliance on Hibernia Bank v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, 411 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1976), as
support for its conclusion that ERISA's definition of the term beneficiary is not broad enough
to include a health care provider is questionable. In Hibernia the court addressed the issue of
whether a bank was a beneficiary as defined in section 1002(8) of ERISA. The court stated:
The bank's amended complaint simply asserts its status as a beneficiary, an
assertion that is amplified only slightly in the Bank's briefs, where the following
argument is made:
"The benfit [sic] to which it is entitled is not a pension payment, or
recompense for hospitalization charges, but it is a benefit payable from
the corpus of the trust; payment of costs of administration is indeed spec-
ified in the trust instruments."
Although the word 'benefit' is not specifically defined by the Act, the Court is
convinced that Congress did not intend to include an entity such as the Bank in
the category of "beneficiaries". This conviction is supported by the definitions of
"employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" in Section 3(1) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). The benefits to which a beneficiary must be entitled are,
in general, "fringe benefits" such as medical disability and vacation payments.
Id. at 489 (emphasis in original).
To begin with, the Hibernia court's statement that "Congress did not intend to include an
entity such as the Bank in the category of 'beneficiaries,' " id., is entirely erroneous. The
Hibernia court, like the Cameron court, ignored the fact that ERISA's definition of the term
"person" as that term is used in ERISA's definition of the term "beneficiary" includes entities.
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v. Deere & Co.," "Congress did not proscribe any qualifications for
a beneficiary. . . . As ERISA as a whole is 'comprehensive and re-
ticulated' . . . and '[t]he assumption of inadvertent omission is...
especially suspect' . . . there can be no assumption that Congress
intended to restrict the class of beneficiaries. "76
The above discussion demonstrates that the Cameron decision
was very poorly reasoned and is not persuasive 'authority.
2. Kennedy v. Deere & Co.
The only other case found that significantly addresses the issue
of whether a health care provider can qualify as a beneficiary as
defined in ERISA is the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Ken-
nedy v. Deere & Co.."7 In Kennedy the plaintiffs, chiropractors, ren-
dered services to participants78 in an ERISA-governed employee
health care plan. In return, the participants assigned to the chiro-
practors the benefits to which they were entitled under the plan. The
chiropractors, as assignees, submitted claims to the plan for payment.
The plan refused to honor some of the assignments. The chiroprac-
tors then filed suit under ERISA asserting that they were benefi-
ciaries as defined in section 1002(8) of ERISA and that, as such,
they were expressly empowered by section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA
See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) (1982); see also supra note 51 (quotation from the Gambino case).
More important, however, is the fact that in Hibernia the "benefit" that the bank was
claiming to be entitled to-payment of costs of administration-was not the sort of benefit that
the plan was designed to provide. This fact appears to have weighed heavily in the Hibernia
court's decision, as evidenced by the court's statement that "[t]he benefits to which a benefi-
ciary must be entitled are, in general, 'fringe benefits' such as medical disability and vacation
payments." Hibernia, 411 F. Supp. at 489 (emphasis added).
In Cameron, by contrast, the benefit that the nursing care facility was claiming to be
entitled to-payment for covered medical expenses-was the precise benefit that the plan was
designed to provide. This distinction, coupled with the fact that the Hibernia court erroneously
concluded that only natural persons can qualify as beneficiaries under ERISA, suggests that
the Cameron court's reliance on Hibernia was misplaced.
75. 118 11. 2d 69, 514 N.E.2d 171 (1987), affg 142 Ill. App. 3d 781, 492 N.E.2d 199
(1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988).
76. Id. at 74, 514 N.E.2d at 173 (citations omitted) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980) and Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)); see also Sladek v. Bell Sys. Management Pension Plan,
880 F.2d 972, 976 (7th Cir. 1989) (the term beneficiary as defined in section 1002(8) of
ERISA should be broadly construed).
77. 118 Ill. 2d 69, 514 N.E.2d 171 (1987), affig 142 Ill. App. 3d 781, 492 N.E.2d 199
(1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988).
78. It can be implied from the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion that the court was of
the belief that the patients were participants. The lower appellate court, however, expressly
characterized the patients as "participants or beneficiaries." Kennedy, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 782,
492 N.E.2d at 200 (emphasis added).
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to sue to recover benefits due under the plan.7 9 The defendant moved
to dismiss the chiropractors' suit alleging that the chiropractors
"lacked standing to sue under ERISA."8° The defendant argued that
"although plan participants may 'designate' a 'beneficiary' who will
then be entitled to benefits under the plan, a participant may desig-
nate only members of his family or other dependents."" Health care
providers, argued the defendant, "cannot be designated by a partici-
pant to receive benefits under a plan." '82 The Illinois Supreme Court
rejected the defendant's argument stating:
Congress did not proscribe any qualifications for a beneficiary.
Section 206(d) [29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)] of ERISA . . . prohibits
the assignment of pension benefits, but there is nothing in
ERISA or in the legislative history showing a congressional in-
tent to prohibit assignments of health care benefits or to limit
the class of persons a participant is permitted to designate to
receive benefits under a health care plan. As ERISA as a
whole is "comprehensive and reticulated" . . . and "[t]he as-
sumption of inadvertent omission is especially suspect" . . .
there can be no assumption that Congress intended to restrict
the class of beneficiaries.8"
The court went on to hold that "when an employee-participant
assigns his right to benefits under the plan to the health care pro-
vider, the provider can bring an action under ERISA to enforce that
right." '84 Thus, the court in effect held that an assignment of benefits
by a participant to a health care provider constitutes a "designation"
of the health care provider as a beneficiary for purposes of section
1002(8) of ERISA and the health care provider, as a beneficiary, is
expressly empowered by section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA to sue to
recover the benefits.
The Kennedy decision is much better reasoned than the Cam-
eron decision. First, the Kennedy court, unlike the Cameron court,
correctly recognized that ERISA places no limitations on the class of
persons who can qualify as a beneficiary. In holding that a partici-
pant may designate a health care provider as a beneficiary, the Ken-
nedy court rejected the Cameron court's erroneous view that in order
79. Kennedy, 118 Ill. 2d at 71, 514 N.E.2d at 172.
80. Id. at 70, 514 N.E.2d at 171.
81. Id. at 73, 514 N.E.2d at 172-73.
82. Id. at 73, 514 N.E.2d at 173.
83. Id. at 74, 514 N.E.2d at 173 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Nach-
man Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980) and Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)).
84. Id. at 76, 514 N.E.2d at 174.
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to qualify as a beneficiary under ERISA one must be: (1) a natural
person, and (2) covered by the plan's provisions.
Second, in determining the manner in which a participant in an
ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan may "designate" a
person as a beneficiary for purposes of section 1002(8) of ERISA,
the Kennedy court, unlike the Comeron court, did not look to section
1055 of ERISA-a clearly inapplicable provision. Rather, the court,
after implicitly recognizing that ERISA is silent on the question of
the manner in which a participant in an ERISA-governed employee
welfare benefit plan may "designate" a person as a beneficiary,
looked to logic and common sense. The Court concluded that the
execution by a participant of an assignment of benefits form qualifies
as a "designation" for purposes of section 1002(8) of ERISA. This
conclusion was sound. An assignment of benefits form clearly and
unambiguously evidences the desire and intent of the participant that
the benefits be paid to the named assignee. Nothing more should be
required. Moreover, an assignment of benefits form, in any event,
clearly meets the Cameron court's "formal election" requirement. As
the lower appellate court in Kennedy noted:
In contrast to Cameron Manor it is uncontested that plaintiffs
here allege "formal," purposeful acts of executing two forms
specifically drafted for the purpose of transferring to plaintiffs
the right to claim benefits due and to receive them directly from
the defendant's health care plan. No greater "formality" is
required. 5
Finally, the Kennedy court in practical effect rejected the Cam-
eron court's suggestion that Congress, in enacting ERISA, did not
intend that health care providers be paid for their services. The Ken-
nedy court, unlike the Cameron court, recognized that if health care
providers are held to have no standing to sue under ERISA they will
be unprotected under both state and federal law86 and will thus be
forced to refuse to treat persons covered by ERISA-governed em-
ployee health care plans unless they are capable of paying for ser-
vices through sources other than the health care plan. Such a result
Congress could never have intended.8"
85. Kennedy, 142 Il1. App. 3d at 786, 492 N.E.2d at 203.
86. Kennedy, 118 11. 2d at 75, 514 N.E.2d at 174 ("If assignees are barred from bring-
ing an action under ERISA they would necessarily be without a remedy" because "section
514(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)] of ERISA . . .would prohibit an assignee from acting under
State law to establish a legal claim to benefits under a plan").
87. It must be noted that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kennedy is not with-
out problems. For example, the court stated that the lower appellate court held "that the
19901
194 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
3. Summary
The law on the issue of whether a health care provider can
plaintiffs, as assignees of a participant's right to receive benefits under the plan, are 'benefi-
ciaries' within section 3(8) [29 U.S.C. § 1002(8)] of ERISA." Id. at 72, 514 N.E.2d at 172
(emphasis added). This statement misconstrues the lower appellate court's opinion. Although
the lower appellate court concluded that the execution by a participant of an assignment of
benefits form and/or a form authorizing the plan to pay the benefits due directly to a health
care provider qualifies as a "designation" for purposes of section 1002(8) of ERISA, see supra
note 58 (quotation from the lower appellate court opinion), the court did not carry this conclu-
sion to its logical end. In other words, after reaching this conclusion, the lower appellate court,
for reasons that are not clear, did not then proceed to reason that the chiropractors had stand-
ing to sue in their own right under section 1132(a)(1)(B) under the theory that they had been
"designated" as beneficiaries by participants for purposes of section 1002(8) of ERISA.
Rather, the lower appellate court reasoned that the chiropractors, as assignees, "ha[d] standing
to sue as the 'participant' or 'beneficiary' in whose shoes [they stood] for purposes of section
1132(a)(1)(B)." Kennedy, 142 11. App. 3d at 787, 492 N.E.2d at 203 (emphasis added).
Thus, the lower appellate court was clearly employing a "derivative standing" theory rather
than the "designation of beneficiary" theory employed by the Illinois Supreme Court. For a
thorough discussion of the derivative standing theory, see infra notes 95-177 and accompany-
ing text (Section II.B. Derivative Standing by Virtue of an Assignment of Benefits). And, in
fact, the lower appellate court could not properly have employed the Illinois Supreme Court's
"designation of beneficiary" theory because the lower appellate court characterized the assign-
ors as "participants or beneficiaries," id. at 782, 492 N.E.2d at 200 (emphasis added), rather
than as just participants as the Illinois Supreme Court implicitly characterized them. See
supra note 78. Section 1002(8) of ERISA empowers only participants to "designate" benefi-
ciaries. Thus, had the assignors in Kennedy in fact been beneficiaries rather than participants
(as the lower appellate court's opinion suggests they might have been), they would not have
been empowered to designate the chiropractors as beneficiaries. It follows, then, that in light of
the lower appellate court's characterization of the assignors as "participants or beneficiaries,"
id., the only theory of standing that the lower appellate court could safely have employed is the
"derivative standing" theory because that theory can be employed when the assignor is either a
participant or a beneficiary. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
The Illinois Supreme Court also stated that the Ninth Circuit in Misic v. Building Serv.
Employees Health and Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d .1374 (9th Cir. 1986), held "that Congress did
not intend to prohibit a participant of a health benefit plan from designating a health care
provider as a beneficiary." Kennedy, 118 IlI. 2d at 76, 514 N.E.2d at 174. The Ninth Circuit
in Misic never held that a participant may "designate" a health care provider as a beneficiary.
To begin with, the assignor-patients in Misic were beneficiaries, not participants. Since section
1002(8) of ERISA empowers only participants to "designate" beneficiaries, it follows that the
assignors in Misic would not have been empowered to "designate" the health care provider,
Dr. Peter Misic, as a beneficiary unless it could somehow be said that in addition to being
beneficiaries, the assignors qualified as participants. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit never stated
that Dr. Peter Misic had standing to sue in his own right under ERISA under the theory that
he had been "designated" a beneficiary by a participant for purposes of section 1002(8) of
ERISA. Rather, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "Dr. Misic, as assignee of beneficiaries
pursuant to assignments valid under ERISA, has standing to assert the claims of his assign-
ors." Misic, 789 F.2d at 1379 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit specifi-
cally stated that Dr. Misic was not "a suitor in his own right," but rather was suing "as
assignee of beneficiaries." Id. at 1378. Dr. Misic, in the Ninth Circuit's words, "stood in the
shoes" of the assignor-beneficiaries. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court clearly misinterpreted the
Misic decision in this regard.
Despite the Illinois Supreme Court's apparent confusion concerning the distinction be-
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qualify as a beneficiary under ERISA is unsettled. The Cameron
court concluded that as a matter of law a health care provider can
never qualify as a beneficiary under ERISA. The Cameron opinion,
however, does not withstand even the slightest scrutiny. The opinion
ignores ERISA provisions that are clearly applicable" and applies
provisions that are clearly inapplicable." The opinion notes that one
of ERISA's purposes is to protect persons covered by employer-spon-
sored health care plans but then, ironically, proceeds to reach a re-
sult that defeats that very purpose.9 ° The opinion refuses to read
ERISA's provisions as meaning what they say,9 and restricts the
meaning of terms used in ERISA where nothing in the statute or
legislative history indicates that such restrictions were ever
intended. 2
The Illinois Supreme Court in Kennedy, on the other hand,
concluded that a health care provider can qualify as a beneficiary
under ERISA. The court recognized that Congress placed no restric-
tions on the class of persons who can qualify as a beneficiary and
held that a participant can designate a health care provider as a ben-
eficiary by assigning his or her benefits to the health care provider.
The Kennedy decision is consistent with ERISA's provisions and
with "the intent of Congress in providing under ERISA for health
and welfare benefit plans"98 and therefore is much better reasoned
than Cameron.9
tween the "derivative standing" theory and the "designation of beneficiary" theory, the reason-
ing employed by the court was sound, and the result it reached was certainly correct.
88. The opinion ignores ERISA's definition of the term "person." See supra notes 48-
55 & 72-76 and accompanying text.
89. The opinion applies section 1055 of ERISA, a clearly inapplicable provision. See
supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
91. The opinion refuses to read ERISA's definition of the term "beneficiary" as mean-
ing what it says. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
92. The opinion unduly restricts ERISA's definition of the term "beneficiary." See
supra notes 72-76 & 48-55 and accompanying text.
93. Kennedy, 118 Ill. 2d at 74, 514 N.E.2d at 173.
94. Two federal district courts have recently adopted the Cameron court's construction
of the term "beneficiary." See Albert Einstein Medical Center v. National Benefit Fund For
Hosp. and Health Care Employees, No. 89-5931 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1989) (WESTLAW,
ALLFEDS Database, 1989 WL 156374) (the hospitals do not "qualify as 'beneficiaries' in
their own right" (citing Cameron)); Pritt v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 81,
84-85 (S.D. W. Va. 1988). Neither opinion, however, analyzes the Cameron opinion and
therefore neither opinion is persuasive.
The Fifth Circuit in Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1988) had an opportunity to address the issue of whether a health care provider can
qualify as a beneficiary under ERISA but chose not to. In Hermann Hospital, Patricia
Nicholas, the spouse of a participant in an ERISA-governed employee health care plan, sought
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B. Derivative Standing By Virtue of an Assignment of Benefits
As discussed in the previous section, the Illinois Supreme Court
medical treatment from Hermann Hospital. After verifying through a MEBA agent that
Nicholas was covered by the plan, hospital administrators had Nicholas execute to the hospital
an assignment of benefits. Id. at 1287. The hospital thereafter rendered services to Nicholas
until her death approximately six months after her admission to the hospital. Id. The services
rendered were valued at $341,920.96. The hospital submitted claims to the plan but the plan
refused to pay the claims. Id. The hospital then filed suit against the plan under section
1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. Id. at 1286. The hospital also asserted state common law claims for
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, equitable estoppel, breach of contract and fraud. Id. The
plan filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the hospital's state common law claims were pre-
empted by ERISA and that the hospital lacked standing to sue under section 1132(a)(1)(B) of
ERISA. The district court granted the plan's motion, and the hospital appealed to the Fifth
Circuit. Hermann Hosp., No. 85-6800 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 1987) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS
Database, 1987 WL 11723), affd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 845 F.2d 1286 (5th
Cir. 1988).
On appeal, the hospital contended that it had standing to sue under ERISA under at least
two theories. First, the hospital contended that as the assignee of a plan beneficiary it had
standing, derivatively, to assert the claims of the beneficiary in whose shoes it stood under
section 1132(a)(1)(B). Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d at 1287. Second, the hospital argued that it
had standing to sue under ERISA under the theory that the list of persons expressly empow-
ered by section 1132(a) of ERISA to sue is not exclusive. Id. The hospital did not, in the Fifth
Circuit's view, contend that it had standing to sue under section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA
under the theory that it was a beneficiary as defined in section 1002(8) of ERISA. Id. ("Her-
mann does not contend that it falls among the parties statutorily authorized by § 1132(a).").
However, a review of the record indicates that the hospital filed two supplemental briefs as-
serting that it had standing to sue under section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA under the theory that
it was a beneficiary as defined in section 1002(8) of ERISA. Though unclear, the Fifth Circuit
apparently was of the opinion that Hermann Hospital was making this argument for the first
time on appeal as evidenced by a statement to that effect in the Fifth Circuit's order granting
the hospital permission to file its first supplemental brief. In any event, the arguments made by
thelhospital in its supplemental briefs merit discussion notwithstanding the fact that the Fifth
Circuit declined to consider them.
In its second supplemental brief the hospital called the court's attention to the following
provision in the MEBA plan: "lAin eligible employee may authorize the Plan to make pay-
ment directly to a provider of services for covered medical expenses hereunder. ... MEBA
1983 Summary Plan Description at 54 (Article XVI, provision 4) (emphasis added), quoted in
Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 2 (filed Mar. 3, 1988), Hermann Hosp., 845
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1988). The hospital argued that this provision raised a question of fact
that had not been resolved at the trial level as to whether Robert Nicholas-the surviving
spouse of Patricia Nicholas and an employee-participant under the MEBA plan-had "au-
thorized" the plan to pay the benefits due Patricia Nicholas' estate directly to the hospital.
According to the hospital's argument, if the fact-finder were to find that Robert Nicholas had
"authorized" the plan to pay the benefits due Patricia Nicholas' estate directly to the hospital,
the hospital could then claim the status of a beneficiary as defined in section 1002(8) of ERISA
under the theory that under the terms of the MEBA plan the hospital "is or may become
entitled to a benefit," 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1982), and/or under the theory that the "authori-
zation" constituted a "designation" by the participant, Robert Nicholas, of the hospital as a
beneficiary. The hospital, as support for its contention that Robert Nicholas had "authorized"
the plan to pay the benefits due Patricia Nicholas' estate directly to it, quoted the following
testimony from the deposition of Robert Nicholas:
Q: Mr. Nicholas, if anyone pays Hermann Hospital any part of this
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in Kennedy v. Deere & Co. 5 held that an assignment of benefits by
a participant to a health care provider constitutes a "designation" of
the health care provider as a beneficiary for purposes of section
1002(8) of ERISA and the health care provider, as a beneficiary, is
expressly empowered by section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA to sue to
recover the benefits. This "designation of beneficiary" theory is one
of two theories under which an assignment of benefits has been held
to give a health care provider standing to sue under ERISA. The
other theory is the derivative standing theory. As will become clear
from the discussion that follows, the derivative standing theory dif-
fers from the "designation of beneficiary" theory in several impor-
tant respects. First, under the derivative standing theory the assign-
ment does not give the assignee-health care provider standing to sue
in its own right as it does under the "designation of beneficiary"
theory but rather gives the assignee-health care provider standing to
sue as the assignor in whose shoes it stands.9 Second, under the
$341,000.00, as between yourself and MEBA, who do you think should pay it?
A: MEBA.
Deposition of Robert E. Nicholas at 65 (May 14, 1986) (emphasis added), quoted in Supple-
mental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4 (filed Mar. 3, 1988), Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1988).
The hospital argued that in light of the above deposition testimony, and in light of the
fact that Robert Nicholas had never in five years submitted a claim to the plan for the benefits
due Patricia Nicholas' estate, it would be difficult for the plan to argue with any degree of
credibility that Robert Nicholas had not "authorized" it, either expressly or impliedly, to pay
the benefits due Patricia Nicholas' estate directly to the hospital.
The hospital's argument, though unaddressed by the Fifth Circuit, had merit. If Robert
Nicholas, an employee-participant under the MEBA plan, had "authorized" MEBA to pay
the benefits due Patricia Nicholas' estate directly to the hospital, the hospital would arguably
have been a beneficiary as defined in section 1002(8) of ERISA under the theory that it was
"entitled to a benefit" under the MEBA plan pursuant'to the provision in the plan allowing
"an eligible employee [to] authorize the Plan to make payment directly to a provider of ser-
vices for covered medical expenses hereunder ..'.." MEBA 1983 Summary Plan Descrip-
tion at 54 (Article XVI, provision 4) (emphasis added), quoted in Supplemental Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellant at 2 (filed Mar. 3, 1988), Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1988).
Moreover, as the hospital argued, for an employee-participant in an ERISA-governed em-
ployee health care plan to authorize the plan to pay benefits due under the plan directly to a
health care provider arguably constitutes a "designation" by the participant of the health care
provider as a beneficiary for purposes of section 1002(8) of ERISA.
95. 118 I1. 2d 69, 514 N.E.2d 171 (1987), affig 142 Il1. App. 3d 781, 492 N.E.2d 199
(1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988).
96. See Misic v. Building Serv. Employees Health and Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374,
1379 (9th Cir. 1986) ("We conclude Dr. Misic, as assignee of beneficiaries pursuant to assign-
ments valid under ERISA, has standing to assert the claims of his assignors." (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted)); Kennedy, 142 Il. App. 3d at 787, 492 N.E.2d at 203 ("[Wjhere an
ERISA plan participant or beneficiary voluntarily elects in a signed writing to assign his rights
to claim health insurance benefits to the provider of health care services, such assignee has
standing to sue as the 'participant' or 'beneficiary' in whose shoes he stands for purposes of
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derivative standing theory the assignment must be "valid" before the
health care provider can be found to have standing.9" Under the
"designation of beneficiary" theory, by contrast, the assignment ar-
guably need not be valid because the assignment form is viewed not
as an assignment per se but rather as constituting the participant's
"designation" of the health care provider as a beneficiary for pur-
poses of section 1002(8) of ERISA. There is nothing in ERISA or
case law to suggest that in order for a writing to constitute a "desig-
nation" of a person as a beneficiary for purposes of section 1002(8)
of ERISA the writing must effect an assignment of benefits. Thus,
an assignment of benefits form, while it might for some technical
reason fail to effect an assignment of benefits (thus defeating "deriv-
ative standing"), may nevertheless constitute a "designation" of the
health care provider as a beneficiary for purposes of section 1002(8)
of ERISA and thereby give the health care provider standing to sue
in its own right. Finally, and perhaps most importantly from the
health care provider's perspective, the derivative standing theory can
be used when the assignor is a participant or a beneficiary such as
the spouse of an employee-participant,98 whereas the "designation of
beneficiary" theory can be used only when the assignor is a partici-
pant because under section 1002(8) of ERISA only a participant can
"designate" a beneficiary.
1. Misic v. Building Service Employees Health and Welfare
Trust
The leading case on the issue of whether an assignment of ben-
efits gives a health care provider derivative standing to sue under
section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA is Misic v. Building Service Em-
ployees Health and Welfare Trust.9 In Misic, Dr. Peter Misic ren-
dered dental services to beneficiaries in an ERISA-governed em-
section 1132(a)(l)(B)." (emphasis added)).
97. See Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d at 1289 (hospital's contention that it has derivative
standing by virtue of assignment "assumes that ...a valid assignment has been made");
Misic, 789 F.2d at 1378 ("a valid assignment confers upon the assignee standing to sue in
place of the assignor").
98. See Misic, 789 F.2d at 1379 ("Dr. Misic, as assignee of beneficiaries pursuant to
assignments valid under ERISA, has standing to assert the claims of his assignors." (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted)); Kennedy, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 787, 492 N.E.2d at 203 ("[W]here an
ERISA plan participant or beneficiary voluntarily elects in a signed writing to assign his rights
to claim health insurance benefits to the provider of health care services, such assignee has
standing to sue as the 'participant' or 'beneficiary' in whose shoes he stands for purposes of
section 1132(a)(l)(B)." (emphasis added)).
99. 789 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1986).
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ployee health care plan. In return, the beneficiaries assigned to Dr.
Misic the benefits due them under the plan. The plan called for pay-
ment of 80 percent of the cost of the beneficiaries' dental care. Dr.
Misic billed the plan directly. The plan paid a portion of the amount
billed but less than the full 80 percent. Dr. Misic sued the plan
under section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA to recover the amount not
paid."' ° In determining whether Dr. Misic had standing to assert the
cause of action provided for in section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, the
Ninth Circuit engaged in a two-part inquiry: (1) does ERISA's anti-
assignment/anti-alienation provision, section 1056(d)(1),1"1 prohibit
an assignment of health care benefits, and (2) if not, does an assignee
of a beneficiary have standing to sue under ERISA?
With respect to whether section 1056(d)(1) prohibits an assign-
ment of health care benefits, the court first noted that this section,
which states that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated,' ' 10 2 ap-
plies by its own terms only to pension plans and therefore has no
effect on welfare plans.'1 3 Further, the court noted that "Part 2" of
ERISA,"'0 in which section 1056(d)(1) is found, is entirely inappli-
cable to welfare plans."5
After recognizing the inapplicability of section 1056(d)(1), the
court went on to note that neither the specific purpose of section
1056(d)(1)" °6 nor the general policies of ERISA would be served by
prohibiting an assignment of health care benefits. The court stated:
Health and welfare benefit trust funds are designed to finance
health care. Assignment of trust monies to health care providers
results in precisely the benefit the trust is designed to provide
and the statute is designed to protect. Such assignments also
protect beneficiaries by making it unnecessary for health care
providers to evaluate the solvency of patients before commencing
medical treatment, and by eliminating the necessity for benefi-
ciaries to pay potentially large medical bills and await compen-
100. Dr. Misic also asserted state law claims sounding in tort and unfair business prac-
tices. Id. at 1376. Those claims were held to be preempted. Id. at 1379.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982).
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Misic, 789 F.2d at 1376.
104. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
105. Misic, 789 F.2d at 1376. The court observed that Part 2's "Coverage" provisionprovides: "This part shall apply to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of
this title (and not exempted under section 1003(b) of this title) other than-(1) an employee
welfare benefit plan .... " 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
106. For a discussion of section 1056(d)(1) and its purpose, see infra note 149.
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sation from the plan. Moreover, assignments permit a trust fund
to obtain improved benefits for beneficiaries by bargaining with
health care providers for better coverage and lower rates.1" 7
Based on these observations the court reached the inescapable
conclusion that section 1056(d)(1) does not prohibit an assignment of
health care benefits.'" 8 The court noted that the Department of La-
bor, which is charged with ERISA's enforcement, "supports this in-
terpretation of the statute."' 0 9
After concluding that the assignments to Dr. Misic were not
prohibited by ERISA, the Misic court went on to conclude that
under federal common law" 0 assignment principles Dr. Misic, as
assignee, stood in the shoes of the beneficiaries, as assignors. Because
the beneficiaries had standing under section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA
to sue to recover benefits due under the plan, the court concluded
107. Misic, 789 F.2d at 1377.
108. Id. ("For these reasons we conclude ERISA does not forbid assignment by a bene-
ficiary of his right to reimbursement under a health care plan to the health care provider."
(footnote omitted)).
The Misic court's conclusion that section 1056(d)(1) does not prohibit an assignment of
health care benefits was recently confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Mackey v.
Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988). The Court stated:
ERISA § 206(d)(1) [29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)] bars (with certain enumerated
exceptions) the alienation or assignment of benefits provided for by ERISA pen-
sion benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Congress did not enact any similar
provision applicable to ERISA welfare benefit plans, such as the one at issue in
this case ....
Ultimately, in examining §§ 206(d)(1) [29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)] and
514(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)] there is no ignoring the fact that, when Congress
was adopting ERISA, it had before it a provision to bar the alienation or gar-
nishment of ERISA plan benefits, and chose to impose that limitation only with
respect to ERISA pension benefit plans and not ERISA welfare benefit plans.
In a comprehensive regulatory scheme like ERISA, such omissions are signifi-
cant ones. . . . Once Congress was sufficiently aware of the prospect that
ERISA plan benefits could be attached and or garnished-as evidenced by its
adoption of § 206(d)(1) [29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)]-Congress' decision to remain
silent concerning the attachment or garnishment of ERISA welfare plan benefits
"acknowledged and accepted the practice, rather than prohibiting it.". . . We
therefore conclude that Congress did not intend to preclude state-law attachment
of ERISA welfare plan benefits.
Id. at 836-38 (emphasis in original) (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Alessi v. Raybes-
tos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 516 (1981)); see also Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc.,
889 F.2d 115, 120-21 (7th Cir. 1989) (endorsing the Supreme Court's view in Mackey "that
the anti-alienation provision of ERISA ...does not apply to welfare benefit plans"). For a
thorough discussion of Mackey, see infra notes 199-228 and accompanying text (Section III.
GARNISHMENT OF EMPLOYEE WELFARE BENEFITS).
109. Misic, 789 F.2d at 1377 n.2.
110. Congress intended for federal courts to develop a federal common law of employee
benefit plans. See infra text accompanying note 121, and infra note 122.
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that Dr. Misic had standing, derivatively, to sue to recover benefits
due under the plan. The court stated:
The remaining question is whether, under federal common law,
the assignee of beneficiaries has standing to sue under ERISA.
ERISA provides civil actions may be brought under the
statute by participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Secre-
tary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). The trust and the Depart-
ment contend that only the parties named in section 1132 have
standing to sue under ERISA, and assignees are not named.
The trust also contends Dr. Misic lacks standing under the
three-part test for implied statutory standing outlined in Fen-
tron Industries Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674
F.2d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982).
These arguments mistakenly treat Dr. Misic as a suitor in
his own right. Dr. Misic sues derivatively, as assignee of benefi-
ciaries. As paragraph 12 of the complaint alleges, Dr. Misic
"stands in the shoes of the beneficiaries;" and Dr. Misic's as-
signors, beneficiaries under the Act, are expressly authorized by
section 1132(a)(1)(B) to sue to recover benefits due under a
plan.
We conclude Dr. Misic, as assignee of beneficiaries pursu-
ant to assignments valid under ERISA, has standing to assert
the claims of his assignors."'
The Misic decision is consistent with ERISA's provisions ,and
policies and therefore is persuasive. The decision was recently cited
with approval by the United States Supreme Court in Mackey v.
Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc.,12 and followed by the
Fifth Circuit in Hermann Hospital v. MEBA Medical & Benefits
Plan." 3
2. Hermann Hospital v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan
In Hermann Hospital 1 the Fifth Circuit recognized the nega-
tive consequences that would follow if health care providers, as as-
signees of beneficiaries and participants in ERISA-governed em-
ployee health care plans, were denied standing to sue under ERISA.
The court stated:
111. Misic, 789 F.2d at 1378-79.
112. 486 U.S. 825, 832 n.6 (1988).
113. 845 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1988).
114. The facts of this case are discussed in detail at supra note 94.
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To deny standing to health care' providers as assignees of
beneficiaries of ERISA plans might undermine Congress' goal
of enhancing employees' health and welfare benefit coverage.
Many providers seek assignments of benefits to avoid billing the
beneficiary directly and upsetting his finances and to reduce the
risk of non-payment. If their status as assignees does not entitle
them to federal standing against the plan, providers would ei-
ther have to rely on the beneficiary to maintain an ERISA suit,
or they would have to sue the beneficiary. Either alternative,
indirect and uncertain as they are, would discourage providers
from becoming assignees and possibly from helping benefi-
ciaries who were unable to pay them "up-front." The providers
are better situated and financed to pursue an action for benefits
owed for their services.1"'
Although the Fifth Circuit concluded that a health care pro-
vider that has been assigned the benefits due a beneficiary under an
ERISA-governed employee health care plan has standing, deriva-
tively, to sue under ERISA as the beneficiary in whose shoes it
stands, the court was unable to determine whether Hermann Hospi-
tal-the plaintiff in the case-had derivative standing because it was
unable to determine, based on the record before it, whether Her-
mann Hospital qualified as an assignee. The court stated:
Mrs. Nicholas apparently executed a form assignment of bene-
fits when she entered the hospital, but MEBA contends such
assignments were not permitted by its plan at that time. Her-
mann responds that even if the executed assignment is invalid,
MEBA is estopped, by its deceptive assurances of coverage,
from denying Hermann's assignment. Hermann alternatively
implies that, regardless of its specific plan provision, MEBA
had in practice accepted assignments to health care providers.
The district court did not address any of these issues, and we
leave them for the district court on remand." 6
The provision in the plan which MEBA contended prohibited
Patricia Nicholas from assigning her benefits to Hermann Hospital
provides in pertinent part that
No employee, dependent or beneficiary shall have the right to
assign, alienate, transfer, sell, hypothecate, mortgage, encum-
ber, pledge, commute, or anticipate any benefit payment here-
under, and any such payment shall not be subject to any legal
process to levy execution upon or attachment or garnishment
115. Herinann Hosp., 845 F.2d at 1289 n.13 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 1290 (footnote omitted).
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proceedings against for the payment of any claims .... 117
This provision is essentially a "spendthrift" provision of the MEBA
plan.l' Assuming for purposes of argument that as a matter of con-
117. MEBA 1983 Summary Plan Description at 54 (Article XVI, provision 4) (empha-
sis added), quoted in Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 27-28, Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1988).
118. Direct support for this proposition is found in two cases involving ERISA welfare
plans. In Electrical Workers, Local No. 1 Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust
Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1979) (en banc), the court was construing a provision in an
ERISA welfare plan similar to the provision in the MEBA plan. The court characterized the
provision as "a standard 'spendthrift' provision of the Trust." Id. at 157. For a thorough
discussion of the Electrical Workers case, see infra notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
In Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 204 Cal. App. 3d 955,
251 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1988), the ERISA welfare plan at issue contained provisions similar to
the provision in the MEBA plan. The court stated: "The trust is a 'spendthrift' trust designed
to insure that the individual laborer does not dissipate the vacation fund until he or she is
eligible for each year's lump sum payment." Id. at 958, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 598 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted). After making this statement, the court dropped a footnote andquoted the provisions in question. Thus, those provisions were considered spendthrift provi-
sions, and made the trust a spendthrift trust. See also Franchise Tax Bd., 679 F.2d 1307,
1308 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The Trust is a spendthrift trust"), vacated on jurisdictional grounds,
463 U.S. 1 (1983). For a detailed discussion of the California Court of Appeals' decision in the
Franchise Tax Board case, see infra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
Suport for the proposition that the provision in the MEBA plan is a spendthrift provi-
sion is also found in cases involving ERISA pension plans. See, e.g., Fox Valley & Vicinity
Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (referring to
stat'iorily-mandated anti-assignment/anti-alienation provisions in ERISA pension plans as
spendthrift provisions).
Clearly, then, the provision at issue in the MEBA plan is a standard spendthrift provi-
sion. Moreover, the MEBA plan is a trust. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982) ("Except as pro-
vided in subsection (b) of this section, all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in
trust by one or more trustees."); see also H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4659 ("This section would deem every
employee benefit fund to be a trust held for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries as well as defraying reasonable administrative expenses");
S. REP. No. 127, 93rd Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4838, 4866 ("Fund assets are . . . deemed a trust and may only be used for the pur-
poses of providing benefits for participants and defraying reasonable expenses"). It follows,
then, that the MEBA plan is a spendthrift trust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
152(2) (1959) ("A trust in which by the terms of the trust or by statute a valid restraint on the
voluntary and involuntary transfer of the interest of the beneficiary is imposed is a spendthrift
trust"); A. SCoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 151, at 83 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter A. SCOTT]("Trusts in which the interest of a beneficiary cannot be assigned by him or reached by his
creditors have come to be known as spendthrift trusts"); see also Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff),
706 F.2d 574, 589 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[Wlithout passing upon the exact limits of plans which
could properly be characterized 'spendthrift trusts,' the employer-created-and-controlled nature
of those plans may well make them analogous to a spendthrift trust"); Chrysler-UAW Pension
Plan v. Watkins (In re Watkins), 95 B.R. 483, '489 (W.D. Mich. 1988) ("[Tlhe Court con-
cludes that the Pension Plan is enforceable under Michigan law as a spendthrift trust"); In re
Hysick, 90 B.R. 770, 777 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) ("We conclude that this Plan would consti-
tute a valid spendthrift trust under state law"); In re Marriage of Parscal, 148 Cal. App. 3d
1098, 1101-06, 196 Cal. Rptr. 462, 463-66 (1983) (ERISA plan containing spendthrift provi-
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tract law this provision would render the assignment to Hermann
Hospital invalid,119 the district court on remand would have to de-
sion characterized by court as spendthrift trust).
Some ERISA plans have been characterized as "self-settled" trusts. See, e.g., Brooks v.
Interfirst Bank (In re Brooks), 844 F.2d 258, 263-64 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Weeks, 106 B.R.
257, 261 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989). This point is significant with respect to the question of the
enforceability of a spendthrift provision in an ERISA welfare plan. See infra notes 120-76 and
accompanying text (Section II.B.2.a. Enforceability of an Anti-Assignment ("Spendthrift")
Provision In an ERISA-Governed Employee Health Care Plan Against a Provider of Neces-
sary Medical Services). Under traditional trust law creditors of the settlor of a self-settled trust
can reach the trust property even though the trust contains a spendthrift provision. Brooks, 844
F.2d at 261; Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Taylor (In re Goff), 812 F.2d 931, 933 (5th Cir. 1987)
("The [self-settled] trust remains valid; only the spendthrift clause is void, allowing creditors to
reach the property held in trust by garnishment.").
119. Based on the discussion that follows, it is submitted that as a matter of contract law
the spendthrift provision in the MEBA plan would not invalidate Hermann Hospital's
assignment.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(b) provides: "A contract term
prohibiting assignment of rights under the contract, unless a different intention is manifested,
• . . gives the obligor a right to damages for breach of the terms forbidding assignment but
does not render the assignment ineffective. ... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 322(2)(b) (1981) (emphasis added).
In Cedar Point Apartments, Ltd. v. Cedar Point Inv. Corp., 693 F.2d 748 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983), the court stated:
Alternatively, even if the phrase "right to assign this Agreement" in para-
graph 28 is construed to apply to an assignment of rights, no intent is thereby
shown to eliminate the power to assign the contracts in violation of the restric-
tions. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 322(2)(b) (1981) states the gen-
eral rule that "[a] contract term prohibiting assignment of rights under the con-
tract, unless a different intention is manifested, . . . gives the obligor a right to
damages for breach of the terms forbidding assignment but does not render the
assignment ineffective .. " Most signifcantly for purposes of this appeal,
neither the form nor terminology of paragraph 28 purports to clearly bar the
power to assign or to invalidate an assignment not made in compliance with
the restrictions. Merely the "right to assign," not the power to assign, is limited
by the express language of the clause. No intent is thereby revealed to avoid an
assignment not meeting the restrictions.
Id. at 754 (emphasis added in part) (footnote omitted).
The court dropped a footnote after making the above-quoted statement, saying:
One recognized commentator has pointed out that a contractual provision
forbidding or restricting an assignment of rights under the contract may take
any one of at least three distinct forms. . . . Only one of these forms reveals the
intent necessary to preclude the power to assign or to cause an assignment
violative of contractual conditions to be wholly void. Such a clause must con-
tain express provisions to the effect that any assignment shall be invalid if not
made in a certain specified way.
Id. at 754 n.4 (citations omitted) (emphasis added in part); see also University Mews Assocs.
v. Jeanmarie, 122 Misc. 2d 434, 440, 471 N.Y.S.2d 457, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
The spendthrift provision in the MEBA plan purports to take away only the right to
assign; it neither takes away the power to assign nor contains language to the effect that any
assignment made shall be void. Therefore, Patricia Nicholas had the power to assign, and the
assignment is valid.
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cide whether a spendthrift provision in an ERISA-governed em-
ployee health care plan is enforceable against a provider of necessary
medical services. Based upon the discussion that follows, it is submit-
ted that a spendthrift provision in an ERISA-governed employee
health care plan is unenforceable against a provider of necessary
medical services as a matter of law.
a. Enforceability of an Anti-Assignment ("Spendthrift")
Provision In an ERISA-Governed Employee Health Care Plan
Against a Provider of Necessary Medical Services
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,120
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices White,
Marshall and Blackmun, stated:
The legislative history [of ERISA] demonstrates that Con-
Of course, the party asserting that the assignment is invalid would argue that common
law contract principles are preempted by ERISA and that, therefore, such principles cannot be
looked to for guidance in determining whether a spendthrift provision in an ERISA welfare
plan operates to invalidate an assignment. This argument, however, would have no merit. In
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1 (1983), the Supreme Court stated that the issue of the "mean-
ing and enforceability" of a spendthrift provision in an ERISA welfare benefit plan "comes
within the class of questions for which Congress intended that federal courts create federal
common law." Id. at 26 (footnote omitted). Because "[tihe development of federal common law
may be informed by state law[,J" HECI Exploration Co. Employees' Profit Sharing Plan v.
Holloway (In re HECI Exploration Co.) 862 F.2d 513, 523 (5th Cir. 1988) (footnote omit-
ted), it follows that courts are free to look to common law contract principles for guidance in
determining whether a spendthrift provision in an ERISA welfare plan operates to invalidate
an assignment.
In Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. 1985), summarily aff d
sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1986), the court stated:
"ERISA does not contain a body of contract law to govern the interpreta-
tion and enforcement of employee benefit plans. Instead, Congress intended for
the courts, borrowing state law where appropriate, and guided by the policies
expressed in ERISA and other federal labor laws, to fashion a body of federal
common law to govern ERISA suits."
Id. at 1147 n.5 (quoting Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1501-02 (9th Cir. 1985)); see
also Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., No. 88-6573 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 1990)
(WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1990 WL 28985) (construing ERISA welfare plan in
accordance with state laws concerning construction of insurance contracts as a matter of federal
common law); Keel v. Group Hospitalization Medical Servs., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 223, 229 n.19
(E.D. Va. 1988) ("In this case, for example, the Court adopts, as part of that body of federal
common law, settled principles of contract interpretation borrowed from state common law;
specifically, contract terms, where unambiguous, should be given their plain meaning"); Hol-
liday v. Xerox Corp., 555 F. Supp. 51, 55 (E.D. Mich. 1982) ("[I]f the state law is pre-
empted, then the contract must be construed in accordance with federal law, in this case the
federal common law of contract. There is no substantial body of federal common law of con-
tract. Thus, state law will be looked to as a guide."), affd, 732 F.2d 548 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 917 (1984).
120. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
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gress intended federal courts to develop federal common law
.... In presenting the Conference Report to the full Senate,
for example, Senator Javits, ranking minority member of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and one of the
two principal Senate sponsors of ERISA, stated that "[ilt is also
intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be devel-
oped by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obli-
gations under private welfare and pension plans." Senator Wil-
liams, the Committee's Chairman and the Act's other principal
Senate sponsor, similarly emphasized that suits involving benefi-
ciaries' rights "will be regarded as arising under the laws of the
United States, in similar fashion to those brought under Section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act." Section 301, of
course, "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal
law" in the context of collective bargaining agreements, to be
derived by "looking at the policy of the legislation and fashion-
ing a remedy that will effectuate that policy." . . . ERISA's
legislative history also demonstrates that Congress intended to
engraft trust-law principles onto the enforcement scheme, . . .
and a fundamental concept of trust law is that courts "will give
to the beneficiaries of a trust such remedies as are necessary for
the protection of their interests." Thus ERISA was not so
"carefully integrated" and "crafted" as to preclude further judi-
cial delineation of appropriate rights and remedies; far from
barring such a process, the statute explicitly directs that courts
shall undertake it."'
Justice Brennan's statement establishes two important proposi-
tions: (1) that Congress intended for the federal courts to develop a
federal common law of employee benefit plans,' 22 and (2) that Con-
121. Id. at 156-57 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added in part) (citations and
footnotes omitted).
122. Support for this proposition is found in other case law as well. See, e.g., Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch,__ U.S. - , - , 109 S. Ct. 948, 954 (1989) ("we have
held that courts are to develop a 'federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-
regulated plans' " (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987))); HECI
Exploration Co., 862 F.2d 513, 523 nn. 18-19 (5th Cir. 1988); Whitworth Bros. Storage Co.
v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 235-36 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986). See generally Ray & Halpern, The Common Law of
ERISA: Federal Courts as Lawmakers, 21 TRIAL 20 (June 1985).
In Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth
Circuit commented on the function of the federal common law of ERISA stating:
But Congress realized that the bare terms, however detailed, of these
IERISA's] statutory provisions would not be sufficient to establish a comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme. It accordingly empowered the courts to develop, in light
of reason and experience, a body of federal common law governing employee
benefit plans. The federal common law serves three related ends. First, it sup-
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gress intended for the law of trusts to apply, at least in some re-
spects, to employee benefit plans."8
In Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Construc-
tion Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California,2' the
United States Supreme Court stated that the issue of the "meaning
and enforceability"12 of a spendthrift provision in an ERISA-gov-
erned employee welfare benefit plan "comes within the class of ques-
tions for which Congress intended that federal courts create federal
common law." "  Therefore, federal courts are authorized-indeed,
plements the statutory scheme interstitially. . . . Second and more generally, it
serves to ramify and develop the standards that the statute sets out in only gen-
eral terms ... Third, Congress viewed ERISA as a grant of authority to the
courts to develop principles governing areas of the law regulating employee ben-
efit plans that had previously been the exclusive province of state law.
Id. at 1499 (citation omitted).
Congress, in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41 (1987), reaffirmed the authority of federal courts to develop federal common law,
stating:
The Committee reaffirms the authority of the Federal courts to shape legal and
equitable remedies to fit the facts and circumstances of the cases before them,
even though those remedies may not be specifically mentioned in ERISA itself.
In cases in which, for instance, facts and circumstances show that the processing
of legitimate benefit claims has been unreasonably delayed or totally disregarded
by an insurer, an employer, a plan administrator, or a plan, the Committee
intends the Federal courts to develop a Federal common law of remedies, in-
cluding (but certainly not limited to) the imposition of punitive damages on the
person responsible for the failure to pay claims in a timely manner.
H.R. REP. No. 801, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 63 (1988).
Federal question jurisdiction can be premised upon federal common law claims. Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) ("[Section] 1331 jurisdiction will support claims
founded upon federal common law"); Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund v.
Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he
rule enunciated in Illinois v. Milwaukee should be applicable in ERISA related actions."
(footnote omitted)).
123. See Firestone, - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 954 ("ERISA abounds with the
language and terminology of trust law. . . . ERISA's legislative history confirms that the
Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions . . . 'codiQy] and make applicable to [ERISA] fiducia-
ries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts' " (quoting legislative
history of ERISA)); see also Massachusetts Mut. Life, 473 U.S. at 152-53 (1985) (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("Congress intended by § 404(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)] to incorporate the
fiduciary standards of trust law into ERISA," id. at 152 (footnote omitted), and "Congress
[also] intended these fiduciary standards to govern the ERISA claims-administration process[,J"
id. at 153 (footnote omitted)); Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v.
Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1463 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The various committee reports
indicate that Congress intended to import into ERISA the fiduciary principles of the law of
trusts, adapted as necessary for employee benefit plans"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 & 1089
(1987).
124. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
125. Id. at 26.
126. Id. (footnote omitted).
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are bound-to create federal common law on the issue of the mean-
ing and enforceability of a spendthrift provision in an ERISA-gov-
erned employee health care plan. Because "[tihe development of fed-
eral common law may be informed by state law[,] '"'2 and/or
because "Congress intended to engraft trust-law principles onto the
enforcement scheme," 12 courts logically should look to the law of
trusts for guidance in developing the federal common law on the is-
sue of the meaning and enforceability of a spendthrift provision in an
ERISA-governed employee health care plan. It is a fundamental
principle of trust law that a spendthrift provision is unenforceable
against a provider of necessaries. 29 .Professor Griswold, in his book
Spendthrift Trusts, states:
A physician who renders necessary medical services to the
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust may enforce his claim for pay-
ment for these services against the trust estate. This should be
true whether the services were rendered with the knowledge of
the trustees or not. The physician who renders necessary ser-
vices should not be relegated to the status of an ordinary credi-
tor and denied recovery .... o80
Professor Scott states that "[w]here the claim is one for furnishing
necessaries to the beneficiary, . . . to permit the enforcement of a
claim against the trust estate tends not to defeat but to promote the
127. HECI Exploration Co. Employees' Profit Sharing Plan v. Holloway (In re HECI
Exploration Co.), 862 F.2d 513, 523 (5th Cir. 1988) (footnote omitted).
128. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156-57 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J. concurring).
129. Section 157(b) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS provides: "Although a
trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest of the beneficiary can be reached
in satisfaction of an enforceable claim against the beneficiary ...(b) for necessary services
rendered to the beneficiary or necessary supplies furnished him . RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 157(b) (1959) (emphasis added).
The "Comment on Clause (b)" observes that "[i]f such a claim were not enforced, it
would tend to prevent the beneficiary from obtaining necessary assistance, and a refusal to
enforce such a claim is not necessary for the protection of the beneficiary's interest under the
trust." Id. § 157 comment on clause (b).
Illustration 3 provides: "A bequeaths $100,000 to B upon a spendthrift trust for C. C is
suddenly taken ill and D, a physician who is present at the time, renders medical services. D
can reach C's interest under the trust in payment for the services." Id. § 157 comment on
clause (b), illustration 3.
Comment "g" provides: "Not only may the claimants enumerated in this Section [157]
reach the interest of the beneficiary by judicial proceedings to satisfy their claims, but a volun-
tary conveyance by the beneficiary of his interest so far as necessary to satisfy such claims is
valid." Id. § 157 comment g (emphasis added).




purpose of the settlor."'' Professor Scott further observes that "[i]t
has been held that a physician who has rendered necessary medical
services to the beneficiary, or a hospital that has rendered such ser-
vices, is entitled to compensation out of the trust estate, although the
trust was a spendthrift trust or a trust for support. '"132
The above discussion strongly supports the proposition that a
spendthrift provision in an ERISA-governed employee health care
plan is unenforceable against a provider of necessary medical services
as a matter of law. For the courts to hold otherwise would be con-
trary to public policy and to the purposes and policies of ERISA
because health care providers would then be unprotected under both
state and federal law 8 " and would have to refuse to treat any indi-
vidual covered by an ERISA-governed employee health care plan
containing a spendthrift provision who seeks treatment intending
that payment be made through the plan and who is unable to pay
for services through sources other than the plan.'8 4 It would obvi-
131. A. SCOTT, supra note 118, § 157.2, at 202.
As the Ninth Circuit noted in Misic, "1h]ealth and welfare benefit trust funds are
designed to finance health care. Assignment of trust monies to health care providers results in
precisely the benefit the trust is designed to provide and the statute is designed to protect."
Misic v. Building Serv. Employees Health and Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir.
1986); see also Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289
(5th Cir. 1988) ("An assignment to a health care provider facilitates rather than hampers the
employee's receipt of health benefits" (footnote omitted)).
132. A. SCOTT, supra note 118, § 157.2, at 202 (footnote omitted).
133. As it stands, health care providers are unprotected under state law because ERISA
has been construed as preempting the state law claims of health care providers as against
ERISA-governed employee health care plans. See cases cited at supra note 24. Of course, the
health care provider could sue the patient individually, see Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d at 1289
n.13 ("If their status as assignees does not entitle them to federal standing against the plan,
. . . they would have to sue the beneficiary"), and get a money judgment against him, and
then garnish the plan under state garnishment law if state garnishment law permits garnish-
ment of fringe benefits. See infra notes 199-228 and accompanying text (Section III. GAR-
NISHMENT OF EMPLOYEE WELFARE BENEFITS). This, however, constitutes minimal, inade-
quate and uncertain protection at best. In states where garnishment of fringe benefits is not
permitted, it would constitute no protection.
If spendthrift provisions in ERISA-governed employee health care plans were held to be
enforceable against health care providers, health care providers would also be unprotected
under federal law because they would have no derivative standing to sue under ERISA. Of
course, the health care provider could try to establish that it has standing to sue in its own
right under the theory that it qualifies as a beneficiary as defined in section 1002(8) of ERISA.
If it could establish this, it would be protected under federal law to that extent. As discussed at
supra notes 41-94 and accompanying text (Section II.A. Persons Expressly Empowered by
Section I132(a) of ERISA to Sue), however, the law on this issue is unsettled.
134. See supra text accompanying note 115; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 157, comment on clause (b) (1959) ("If such a claim were not enforced, it would
tend to prevent the beneficiary from obtaining necessary assistance"); Misic, 789 F.2d at 1377
(if assignments were not permitted it would be necessary "for health care providers to evaluate
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ously be contrary to public policy to place participants and benefi-
ciaries in ERISA-governed employee health care plans containing a
spendthrift provision in a situation of being unable to obtain health
care."' 5 Moreover, it would "undermine Congress' goal of enhancing
employees' health . . . benefit coverage"'3 6 and frustrate ERISA's
policy of ensuring "the continued well-being and security of millions
of employees and their dependents."'37 Further, it would contravene
ERISA's policy of fostering the successful development of employer-
employee relations.' The successful development of employer-em-
ployee relations obviously would not be fostered if plan participants
and beneficiaries were unable to obtain the health care that their
employee health care plan was designed to enable them to finance
merely because the plan contains a spendthrift provision that does
not contain an exception for health care providers. Further, in the
unlikely event that a health care provider, for whatever reason, were
willing to treat an individual covered by an ERISA-governed em-
ployee health care plan containing an enforceable spendthrift provi-
sion in exchange for an assignment of benefits, the trustees' refusal
to honor the assignment would result in the individual being sued in
his or her individual capacity by the health care provider.3 9 The
successful development of employer-employee relations would not be
fostered if employees and their beneficiaries were constantly sub-
jected to lawsuits by health care providers merely because their em-
ployee health care plan contains a spendthrift provision that does not
the solvency of patients before commencing medical treatment").
135. "Spendthrift trusts are not enforceable . . . when the enforcement would be con-
trary to public policy." In re Hysick, 90 B.R. 770, 774 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). See generally
C. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 224 (Rev. 2d ed. 1979).
136. Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d at 1289 n.13; see also Kennedy v. Deere & Co., 118 Il.
2d 69, 74, 514 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1987) (referring to "the intent of Congress in providing
under ERISA for health . . . benefit plans"), aff'g 142 Il. App. 3d 781, 492 N.E.2d 199
(1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982).
138. In enacting ERISA, Congress intended to protect employer-employee relations.
Fentron Indus., Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300, 1305 (9th Cir.
1982); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982) (employee benefit plans "have become an impor-
tant factor affecting the stability of employment and the successful development of industrial
relations" (emphasis added)); cf. Adam v. Joy Mfg. Co., 651 F. Supp. 1301, 1306 (D. N.H.
1987) ("ERISA was also crafted to protect the interests of employers" (emphasis in original));
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4639, 4647 (Congress passed ERISA, in part, to "strike an appropriate balance be-
tween the interests of employers . . . and the need of the workers for a level of protection
which will adequately protect their rights" (emphasis added)).
139. See Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d at 1289 n.13 ("If their status as assignees does not




contain an exception for health care providers.
Not only would it be contrary to public policy and to the pur-
poses and policies of ERISA for the courts to hold that a spendthrift
provision in an ERISA-governed employee health care plan is en-
forceable against a provider of necessary medical services, but it
would also be directly contrary to ERISA's provisions. As the Fifth
Circuit stated in Hermann Hospital:
ERISA contains no anti-assignment provision with regard to
health care benefits of ERISA-governed medical plans, nor is
there any language in the statute which even remotely suggests
that such assignments are proscribed or ought in any way to be
limited. As Misic notes, the existence of an elaborate and com-
plex statutory anti-assignment clause for ERISA pension bene-
fits makes significant the complete absence of any anti-assign-
ment clause applicable to ERISA health benefits, . . . especially
in light of the Supreme Court's recognition of ERISA as "com-
prehensive and reticulated." . . . Moreover, the purpose of
ERISA's proscription on assignment of pension benefits, "[t]o
further insure that the employees' accrued benefits are actually
available for retirement purposes," would not be served by ap-
plying it to health care benefits. An assignment to a health care
provider facilitates rather than hampers the employees' receipt
of health benefits. . . . These factors comprise sufficient evi-
dence of Congress' intention to allow the assignment of health
benefits. 140
The Fifth Circuit's statement makes clear that ERISA, by its
own terms, does not prohibit the assignment of health care benefits.
Thus, for the courts to hold that a spendthrift provision in an
ERISA-governed employee health care plan is enforceable against a
provider of necessary medical services would be directly contrary to
ERISA's provisions.
A further reason why a spendthrift provision in an ERISA-gov-
erned employee health care plan should be held by the courts to be
unenforceable against a provider of necessary medical services as a
matter of law is because for the trustees of the plan to include within
the plan a provision that has the potential of forcing health care
providers to refuse treatment to plan participants and beneficiaries
constitutes arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable conduct14 1 and
140. Id. at 1289-90 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted).
141. Indeed, the universal employee health care plan "allows the assignment of health
insurance benefits to people who are not covered directly by a plan." Oversight Hearing,
supra note 12, at 53 (statement of Deborah J. Chollet, Ph.D., Research Associate, Employee
1990]
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thus constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duties owed by the trustees
to the plan participants and beneficiaries.142 This rationale was ap-
plied by the Third Circuit in Northeast Department ILGWU Health
and Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare
Fund,4" in holding an "escape" clause unenforceable as a matter of
law. The court stated:
[O]ne very important policy underlying ERISA is that employ-
ees enrolled in a benefit plan should not be deprived of compen-
sation that they reasonably anticipate under the plan's pur-
ported coverage. Escape clauses, however, risk just such a
result. . . . In our view, trustees who incorporate in a plan a
provision that has the potential to harm participants in this way
have indeed acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Accordingly, we hold that the escape clauses in ERISA
covered employee benefit plans are unenforceable as a matter of
law.144
Likewise, the harm that would result if spendthrift provisions
in ERISA-governed employee health care plans were enforced
against health care providers militates in favor of the conclusion that
for the trustees of an ERISA-governed employee health care plan to
include within the plan a spendthrift provision that does not contain
an exception for health care providers constitutes arbitrary, capri-
cious and unreasonable conduct and thus constitutes a breach of the
fiduciary duties owed by the trustees to the plan participants and
beneficiaries.
No policy of ERISA would be served by prohibiting the assign-
ment of health care benefits to health care providers. The plan might
argue that to prohibit the assignment of health care benefits to a
Benefit Research Institute, Washington, D.C.) (emphasis added).
142. ERISA imposes fiduciary duties upon plan trustees. Specifically, section 1104 of
ERISA requires trustees to "discharge . .. [their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries," 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982), and "for the
exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries. ... Id.
§ 1104(a)(1)(A)(i). In National Labor Relations Bd. v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981),
the Supreme Court stated:
Under principles of equity, a trustee bears an unwavering duty of complete
loyalty to the beneficiary of the trust, to the exclusion of all other parties. ...
To deter the trustee from all temptation and to prevent any possible injury to
the beneficiary, the rule against a trustee dividing his loyalties must be enforced
with "uncompromising rigidity."
Id. at 329-30 (citations omitted) (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E.
545, 546 (1928)).
143. 764 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1985).
144. Id. at 163-64 (footnotes omitted).
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health care provider protects the financial integrity of the plan. This
argument, however, would be meritless. To begin with, the financial
integrity of the plan is meaningless unless health care is available.
Moreover, to allow health care providers, as assignees of plan par-
ticipants and beneficiaries, to sue under ERISA would have abso-
lutely no effect on the financial integrity of the plan because "an
assignee takes only the interest of its assignor."'1 4 5 Therefore, the
plan would not be subjected to any greater liability than if the pa-
tient himself were seeking to enforce his own rights. If the health
care provider were successful on the merits, the plan would simply
be paying the health care provider the same amount it would other-
wise by paying the patient.
The plan might also argue that under ERISA it is the partici-
pant or beneficiary who is entitled to receive benefits due under the
plan and that, therefore, to prohibit the assignment of benefits to a
health care provider furthers the policies of ERISA.14  This argu-
ment would also be meritless. The participant or beneficiary to
whom services have been rendered has no legitimate expectation of
keeping the benefits that he or she receives from the plan pursuant to
a claim. 147 He or she fully expects to pay the benefits to the health
care provider. Therefore, if the health care provider were to receive
the benefits directly by virtue of an action for benefits against the
plan, the expectations of the participant or beneficiary would not be
affected. Indeed, the expectations of the participant or beneficiary
would be met because by assigning his or her benefits to the health
care provider the participant or beneficiary evidences his or her in-
tent and desire that the benefits be paid directly to the health care
provider. Moreover, where a health care provider has rendered ser-
145. United States v. Three Hundred Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Dol-
lars ($364,960.00) In United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 326 (5th Cir. 1981); see also
Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs. v. Upholsterers Int'l Union Health and Welfare
Fund, 686 F. Supp. 708, 712 (W.D. Wis. 1988) ("By assigning to plaintiff their right to
benefits under defendant's plan, the members ...have assigned any potential claim they
might have under the plan, nothing more and nothing less").
146. In Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1988), for example, the plan argued
in its brief on appeal that "[tihere is no question that, under ERISA, it is the employee who is
entitled to receive benefits from a welfare plan . . . .ERISA created no duty whatsoever on
the part of plans toward service providers." Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 20-21 (emphasis in
original), Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d 1286. Ironically, as noted by the hospital in its reply
brief, the plan had not paid Mr. Robert Nicholas-the employee-participant under the MEBA
plan and the surviving spouse of Patricia Nicholas, the woman to whom the hospital rendered
services-nor the estate of Patricia Nicholas, any benefits. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant
at 7, Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d 1286.
147. This assumes, of course, that the participant or beneficiary has not previously paid
the provider's bill out of his or her own pocket.
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vices to a participant or beneficiary it is the health care provider, not
the participant or beneficiary, that needs to be made whole.1" 8 The
participant or beneficiary has already been made "whole" by virtue
of the fact that he or she has obtained medical services.
In summary, spendthrift provisions in ERISA-governed em-
ployee health care plans should be held unenforceable against health
care providers as a matter of law under the principle of trust law
which holds that a spendthrift provision is unenforceable against a
provider of necessaries. To hold otherwise would be contrary to pub-
lic policy and to the provisions and policies of ERISA.
i. Case Law
Two cases directly address the issue of the enforceability of a
spendthrift provision in an ERISA-governed employee welfare bene-
fit plan.14 In each case the spendthrift provision was held to be un-
148. Again, this assumes that the provider's bill has not already been paid by the par-
ticipant or beneficiary out of his or her own pocket.
149. Although only two cases have been found addressing the issue of the enforceability
of a spendthrift provision in an ERISA welfare benefit plan, many cases have addressed the
issue of the enforceability of a spendthrift provision in an ERISA pension plan. ERISA's anti-
assignment/anti-alienation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982), mandates that all pen-
sion plans contain a spendthrift provision. This provision does not apply to welfare plans. See
supra note 108 (quotation from the Supreme Court's opinion in Mackey), supra notes 102-05
and accompanying text, and supra text accompanying note 140. The provision is designed to
ensure that an employee's pension will be available upon retirement. Hermann Hosp., 845
F.2d at 1289 ("the purpose of ERISA's proscription on assignment of pension benefits [is]...
'[t]o further insure that the employees' accrued benefits are actually available for retirement
purposes' " (quoting legislative history of ERISA) (footnote omitted)); Misic v. Building Serv.
Employees Health and Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[Tlhe pension
anti-assignment provision serves the general goal of ERISA: 'to assure that individuals who
have spent their careers in useful and socially productive work will have adequate incomes to
meet their needs when they retire.' " (quoting legislative history of ERISA)).
Courts have found numerous implied exceptions to ERISA's pension anti-assignment/
anti-alienation provision. In the following cases, for example, an implied exception was found
because of the misconduct, fraud or wrongdoing of the individual seeking to invoke the provi-
sion: Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457, 1459-61 (10th Cir.
1988) (pension benefits of union official who embezzled money from the union or pension fund
placed in constructive trust), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989); Crawford
v. La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir.) (pension benefits of trustee who
embezzled money from plan offset and applied to judgment obtained against him by plan
participants), cert. denied sub noa. Goldstein v. Crawford, 484 U.S. 943 (1987); St. Paul Fire
and Marine Ins. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 551-52 (11th Cir. 1985) (pension benefits of bank
employee who was convicted of misapplying bank funds garnished to satisfy judgment against
him); Calhoun v. FDIC, 653 F. Supp. 1288, 1293-94 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (following St. Paul).
But see McLaughlin v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1307, 1310 (5th Cir. 1988) (district court which
allowed equitable offset remedy against a nonfiduciary who was jointly and severally liable for
knowingly participating in a fiduciary's breach "should have followed the lead of those courts
which hold that additional exceptions to ERISA's vesting and inalienability provisions should
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enforceable. The first case to address the issue was Electrical Work-
be created by Congress, not the courts"); United Metal Prods. Corp. v. National Bank of
Detroit, 811 F.2d 297, 299-301 (6th Cir. 1987) (refusing to allow employer to garnish em-
ployee's pension benefits to satisfy judgment against employee arising from employee's embez-
zlement of money belonging to employer), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988); Ellis Nat'l
Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving Trust, 786 F.2d 466, 469-72 (2d Cir. 1986) (refusing to recog-
nize theft or fraud exception to ERISA's pension anti-assignment/anti-alienation provision);
Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268, 269-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (refusing to
recognize fraud exception). See generally Note, Employee Theft and ERISA: A Proposed
Amendment to Garnish Pension Benefits, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 315 (1988); Note,
ERISA-Exceptions to the Anti-Alienation Provision: Strengthening ERISA's Protection
Through a Fraud Amendment, 10 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 317 (1988).
The Fifth Circuit recently held that "a controversy between good-faith adverse claimants
to pension plan benefits is subject to settlement like any other, and that an assignment made
pursuant to a bona fide settlement of such a controversy is not invalidated by the anti-aliena-
tion provision of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), or by that of the Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. § 401(a)(13)." Stobnicki v. Textron, Inc., 868 F.2d 1460, 1465 (5th Cir. 1989). In
interpreting ERISA's anti-assignment/anti-alienation provision the court stated:
Although the general purpose of the anti-alienation provision is clear, Con-
gress often fails to note that broad, sweeping prohibitions in the law rarely work
justice, and often work to frustrate the purpose for which a law was originally
enacted. We will not ascribe to Congress the intent of making an unreasonable
law-one requiring terminal litigation, rather than favoring settlements as does
the general law. When a law so vaguely worded leads to an absurd result,
courts look carefully to see if that result could have been anticipated. If so, we
must carry it out; if not we must try somehow to make sense of the enactment.
While we agree with Francis Bacon that judges should interpret and not make
law, we are also mindful that he imposed an obligation on judges to use and
apply the law wisely.
Id. at 1462-63.
The court reasoned that to strictly construe ERISA's anti-assignment/anti-alienation pro-
vision as prohibiting claimants to pension benefits from settling their dispute would be con-
trary to the purposes and policies of ERISA because the prevailing party in litigation would
win "little more than a Pyrrhic victory" due to the fact that attorney fees would have to be
paid from the pension benefits recovered, leaving the winner with little or nothing to live on.
Id. at 1464. The court concluded:
Little comfort indeed . . . is to be found in litigating away pension plan benefits
to satisfy the blind edicts of an anti-alienation provision that creates unjust and
unanticipated consequences, frustrating the purpose of the law. Like other
courts which have faced it, we therefore conclude that the apparent statutory
bar against alienation of pension benefits must once again yield to reason and to
the purposes for which the Act was written.
Id.
In the following cases, the court found an implied exception to ERISA's pension anti-
assignment/anti-alienation provision because child support, alimony or community property
was involved: Savings and Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038,
1041-43 (7th Cir. 1983) (property division); Bowen v. Bowen, 715 F.2d 559, 560 (11th Cir.
1983) (alimony); Operating Eng'rs' Local No. 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650
F.2d 196, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1981) (alimony); Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314, 315 (2d Cir.
1979) (spouse and child support); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d
Cir. 1979) (alimony and child support), cited with approval in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983); Employees Say. Plan of Mobile Oil Corp. v. Geer, 535 F.
Supp. 1052, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (community property); Ball v. Revised Retirement Plan for
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ers, Local No. 1 Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust
Fund.1"' In Electrical Workers, a creditor of an individual covered
by an ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan obtained a
judgment against the individual. 5 ' The creditor thereafter sought to
enforce the judgment by garnishing benefits due the individual under
the plan.' The creditor based its right to garnish on the Missouri
wage garnishment statute. The plan responded by asserting, among
other things, that a spendthrift provision in the plan instrument pro-
hibited the creditor from garnishing the individual's benefits. 5 In
deciding the case, the Missouri Supreme Court engaged in a three-
part inquiry: (1) does ERISA's anti-assignment/anti-alienation pro-
Salaried Employees of Johns-Mansville Corp. and Subsidiaries, 522 F. Supp. 718, 720 (D.
Colo. 1981) (spousal support); Central States v. Parr, 480 F. Supp. 924, 925 (E.D. Mich.
1979) (alimony); Senco, Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902, 908 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (alimony and
child support); Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 460 F. Supp. 978, 982 (C.D. Cal.
1978) (community property), aff'd, 632 F.2d 745 (1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981);
Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1153-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (spouse and child support);
Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 924-31 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (community property), affd, 632
F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Seafarers Int'l Union, Pac. Dist.-Pac. Mari-
time Ass'n Pension Plan v. Stone, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); In re Marriage of Williams, 163 Cal.
App. 3d 753, 760-66, 209 Cal. Rptr. 827, 831-35 (1985) (spousal support); In re Marriage of
Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 125-26, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362, 368-69 (1979) (property division),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980);
Knapp v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 548, 549 (Minn. 1980) (child support); Hopkins v. Hopkins,
626 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (spousal support); Western Elec. Co. v. Trapha-
gen, 166 N.J. Super. 418, 426-30, 400 A.2d 66, 69-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)
(alimony); Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49, 52-57, 394 A.2d 153, 155-57 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1978) (alimony); Pepitone v. Pepitone, 108 Misc. 2d 12, 13-14, 436 N.Y.S.2d 966,
968 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (alimony and child support); In re M.H. v. J.H., 93 Misc. 2d 1016,
1020-22, 403 N.Y.S.2d 411, 414-16 (Fan. Ct. 1978) (child support); Wanamaker v.
Wanamaker, 93 Misc. 2d 784, 786-89, 401 N.Y.S.2d 702, 703-06 (Fain. Ct. 1978) (alimony).
See generally Note, Garnishment of ERISA Benefits to Satisfy Family Support Obligations:
Achieving Equity Through Judicial Legislation, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 961 (1980).
The family support exception to ERISA's pension anti-assignment/anti-alienation provi-
sion has been codified by Congress. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856
F.2d 1457, 1459 n.2 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (Supp. V 1987)), cert.
granted, - U.S. -. , 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989). For a more detailed discussion of the family
support exception, as codified, see Arizona Laborers, Teamsters, and Cement Masons, Local
395 Pension Trust Fund v. Nevarez, 661 F. Supp. 365, 367-68 (D. Ariz. 1987).
For general commentary on ERISA's pension anti-assignment/anti-alienation provision,
see Kirschbaum, ERISA Spendthrift Rules-It Just Shouldn't Be This Hard, 11 CAMPBE£L
L. REV. 29 (1988); Sherman, Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Problem of
Creditors' Rights, 55 IND. L.J. 247 (1980).
150. 583 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1979) (en banc). For student commentary on this case, see
Recent Case, 45 Mo. L. REV. 369 (1980).
151. Electrical Workers, 583 S.W.2d at 156.
152. Id. at 157.
153. Id.
ERISA
vision, section 1056(d)(1),' prohibit the garnishment of welfare
benefits? (2) if not, does ERISA's preemption provision, section
-1 44(a),' 55 preempt the Missouri wage garnishment statute? and (3)
if not, does the spendthrift provision in the plan instrument prohibit
the creditor from garnishing benefits due the individual? Regarding
the first inquiry, the court correctly noted that ERISA's anti-assign-
ment/anti-alienation provision, section 1056(d)(1), applies only to
pension plans and therefore has no effect on welfare plans. 56 The
court next proceeded to determine whether ERISA's preemption
provision, section 1144(a), preempts Missouri's wage garnishment
statute. Relying on an Oregon Appellate Court decision, the court
declined to hold that section 1144(a) preempts Missouri's wage gar-
nishment statute, stating:
The enforcement of state court money judgments by creditors is
a valid area of state concern, and is one which is totally unregu-
lated by ERISA with respect to welfare plans. We decline to
interpret [section 1144(a) of] ERISA to require preemption of
Missouri laws in this area, "in the absence of any legislative
declaration that Congress intended to create an enormous regu-
latory vacuum in areas that traditionally have been matters of
vital state concern.) 1 5 7
Finally, the Missouri Supreme Court turned to the issue of
whether the spendthrift provision in the plan prohibited the creditor
from garnishing benefits due the individual under the plan. 5 8 As a
preliminary matter, the court first reasoned that the individual's va-
cation benefits were "wages or earnings" within the meaning of the
Missouri wage garnishment statute and were therefore subject to
garnishment.' 59 The only issue remaining was whether the benefits
were nevertheless protected from garnishment by virtue of the spend-
154. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982). For the text of section 1056(d)(1), see supra text
accompanying note 102.
155. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). See supra note 10 for a discussion of section 1144(a).
156. Electrical Workers, 583 S.W.2d at 157-58 n.2.
157. Id. at 159 (quoting Gast v. Oregon, 36 Or. App. 441, 458, 585 P.2d 12, 23
(1978)).
The United States Supreme Court recently reached the same conclusion as the Electrical
Workers court in Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc, 486 U.S. 825, 830-34
(1988) (ERISA does not preempt Georgia's general garnishment statute insofar as the statute
concerns ERISA welfare plans). The Court cited Electrical Workers, among other cases, as
support for its conclusion. Id. at 832 n.6. For a thorough discussion of Mackey, see infra notes
199-228 and accompanying text (Section III. GARNISHMENT OF EMPLOYEE WELFARE
BENEFITS).
158. Electrical Workers, 583 S.W.2d at 159-62.
159. Id. at 159-61.
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thrift provision in the plan.' 0 The court held that the spendthrift
provision was contrary to public policy and therefore invalid and un-
enforceable because it prohibited that which the Missouri wage gar-
nishment statute permitted."'
The only other case found that directly addresses the issue of
the enforceability of a spendthrift provision in an ERISA-governed
employee welfare benefit plan is Franchise Tax Board of the State
of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern
California.'" In Franchise Tax Board, three beneficiaries of an
ERISA-governed employee vacation benefit plan containing a spend-
thrift provision owed taxes to the state of California.' The
Franchise Tax Board, pursuant to section 18817 of the California
Revenue and Taxation Code, issued to the plan notices to withhold
benefits due the beneficiaries under the plan.'" The plan, after ob-
taining an opinion letter from the Administrator for Pension and
Welfare Benefit Programs, notified the Tax Board that it would not
honor the Board's levies.'6 5 The Board thereafter filed suit against
the plan seeking damages in the amount of the taxes owed by the
three plan beneficiaries "and a declaration that [the plan] was obli-
gated to honor all future levies by the Board." '' In deciding
whether the plan was obligated to honor the Board's levies, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals engaged in a three-part inquiry similar to
the three-part inquiry engaged in by the Electrical Workers court:
(1) does ERISA's anti-assignment/anti-alienation provision, section
1056(d)(1),' 67 prohibit the Tax Board from levying upon benefits
due under an ERISA-governed employee welfare plan? (2) if not,
does ERISA's preemption provision, section 1144(a),' 68 preempt sec-
tions 18817 and 18818 of the California Revenue and Tax Code,
160. Id. at 162.
161. Id. The court stated:
Respondent contends that § 525.030 RSMo 1975 Supp., authorizes the
garnishment of wages and earnings and that a spendthrift provision which pur-
ports to prevent such garnishment is contrary to that statute and is thereby con-
trary to public policy. We agree. Section 525.030 sets the maximum amount of
a judgment debtor's wages which may be garnished. Extending greater protec-
tion then [sic) that afforded by the statute to some wage earners, but not to
others, would violate the intent of that statute.
Id.
162. 204 Cal. App. 3d 955, 251 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1988).
163. Id. at 959, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 959, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
167. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982).
168. Id. § 1144(a).
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and (3) if not, does the spendthrift provision in the plan instrument
prohibit the Tax Board from levying upon benefits due under the
-plan? Regarding the first inquiry, the court noted that ERISA's
anti-assignment/anti-alienation provision, section 1056(d)(1), applies
only to pension plans and therefore has no effect on welfare plans.169
The court then. considered the effect of ERISA's preemption provi-
sion, section 1144(a), on sections 18817 and 18818 of the California
Revenue and Tax Code. The court likened sections 18817 and
18818 to ordinary state garnishment laws and therefore held that
under the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Mackey
v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc. 17 0 they were not pre-
empted by ERISA.17 ' Finally, the court considered the effect of the
spendthrift provision in the plan itself on the Tax Board's ability to
levy upon benefits due beneficiaries under the plan. The plan argued
that the case was distinguishable from Mackey on the ground that in
Mackey there was no spendthrift provision in the plan itself.1 72 The
court rejected this argument noting that the Supreme Court in
Mackey "held that ERISA does not preclude state-law attachment of
ERISA welfare plan benefits, without qualification. 17'  Thus, the
spendthrift provision in the plan was held not to prohibit the Tax
Board from levying upon benefits due beneficiaries under the plan.
The court stated: "To hold that anti-alienation provisions in a wel-
fare benefit plan immunizes the plan from attachment and garnish-
ment of welfare benefits would be in effect to find preemption. ' 1,74
In the same way that "ERISA does not preclude state-law at-
tachment of ERISA welfare plan benefits, without qualification,' ' 75
ERISA does not preclude the assignment of such benefits, without
qualification.'7 6 Thus, under the reasoning of Franchise Tax Board,
an anti-assignment ("spendthrift") provision in an ERISA-governed
employee health care plan should be held by the courts to be unen-
forceable against a health care provider as a matter of law.
169. Franchise Tax Board, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 964, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
170. 486 U.S. 825 (1988). For a thorough discussion of Mackey, see infra notes 199-228
and accompanying text.
171. Franchise Tax Board, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 965-66, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 602-03.
172. Id. at 966, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
173. Id. at 967, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See supra note 108 (quotation from the Supreme Court's opinion in Mackey),
supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text, and supra text accompanying note 140.
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3. Summary
Virtually every court that has considered the issue has con-
cluded that a health care provider that has been assigned the benefits
due a participant or beneficiary in an ERISA-governed employee
health care plan in exchange for services rendered has standing, de-
rivatively, to sue the plan under section 1132(a)(1) (B) to recover the
benefits. 177 The Fifth Circuit in Hermann Hospital held that the
assignment to the health care provider must be "valid," and re-
manded for a determination of whether the assignment in question
was valid in light of, among other things, the plan's assertion that
assignments were prohibited under the terms of its plan. It is sub-
mitted that if the spendthrift provision in the plan in question in
Hermann Hospital could be construed as invalidating the assign-
ment to Hermann Hospital as a matter of contract law, the provision
should be held by the district court on remand to be unenforceable as
a matter of law against Hermann Hospital based on the principle of
trust law which holds that a spendthrift provision is unenforceable
against a provider of necessaries. To hold otherwise would be con-
trary to public policy and to the provisions and policies of ERISA.
Moreover, it would be to place in the hands of the trustees of an
ERISA health care plan the power to decide whether health care
providers will have derivative standing to sue the plan. To render
the plan immune from suit by a health care provider under a deriva-
tive standing theory, the trustees would simply need to insert in the
plan a spendthrift provision taking away both the right and the
power of plan participants and beneficiaries to assign 'their benefits
to health care providers, and providing that any such assignment
shall be void. This would defeat the health care provider's derivative
standing by rendering the assignment invalid, and would constitute
an end-run around Misic and Her.mann Hospital. Such a result
would be untenable.
C. Standing To Sue Under The Theory That The List of Persons
Expressly Empowered By Section 1132(a) of ERISA to Sue Is Not
Exclusive
Section 1132(a) of ERISA expressly empowers participants,
beneficiaries, fiduciaries and the Secretary of Labor to bring civil
actions under ERISA.' 78 Whether other persons may bring civil ac-
177. See cases cited at supra note 39.
178. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 1132(a).
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tions under ERISA "has been the subject of much debate ' 17 9 among
the United States Courts of Appeals. The debate has focused primar-
ily on the issue of whether employers,' 80 employee benefit plans,'
and unionss' have standing to sue under ERISA.
179. Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1287 (5th
Cir. 1988) (footnote omitted); see also Note, ERISA: To Sue or Not to Sue, supra note 33, at
240-41 ("There is a fundamental split among the United States Courts of Appeals concerning
whether parties not specifically enumerated in section 502(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] have
standing to bring civil actions to enforce ERISA's provisions").
180. Compare Fentron Indus., Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300,
1304-05 (9th Cir. 1982) (employer has standing to sue under ERISA) with Giardono v. Jones,
867 F.2d 409, 412-13 (7th Cir. 1989) (employer does not have standing to sue under ERISA).
See generally Note, ERISA: To Sue or Not To Sue, supra note 33 (addressing issue of
whether employers have standing to sue under ERISA). Cf Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v.
Western Pa. Teamsters and Employers Pension Fund, 847 F.2d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1988)
("[Wie hold that, under the federal common law of pension plans, Colteryahn, as a defrauded
employer, may sue in federal court for the return of any withdrawal liability sums that were
assessed as a result of a fraudulent inducement to join the Fund" (emphasis added)); Kahler
Corp. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 4-88-1109 (D. Minn. Oct. 2, 1989)
(WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1989 WL 119176) (employer likely does not have stand-
ing to sue under ERISA in its capacity as an employer but does have standing to sue under
ERISA in its capacity as an ERISA fiduciary and under the federal common law).
The specific issue of whether an employer may sue under ERISA to recover overpay-
ments to an ERISA plan has been the subject of much recent case law and commentary. See,
e.g., Airco Indus. Gases, Inc. v. Teamsters Health and Welfare Pension Fund, 850 F.2d 1028,
1034 n.6 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing cases that address the "hotly debated" question of "whether an
action by employer-contributors to recover overpayments can be implied from ERISA, or cre-
ated under the theory of unjust enrichment"); see also South Cent. United Food & Commer-
cial Workers Unions v. C & G Markets, Inc., 836 F.2d 221, 224-25 (5th Cir.) ("ERISA does
not provide a private right of action to an employer seeking to recover mistakenly overpaid
contributions," id. at 224, however, "we hold that there is a right to offset mistakenly overpaid
contributions against a delinquency owed" where "the original action was brought by the plan
trustee against the employer." Id. at 225), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988). See generally
Stone, A Path of No Return: Employer Overpayments Into Employee Benefit Plans, 8 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 68 (1986); Note, An Employer's Implied Cause of Action For Restitution Under
Section 403 of ERISA, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1985); Note, Implying a Statutory Right
for Employers for the Return of Mistaken Overcontributions to a Multiemployer Employee
Benefit Plan, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 396 (1987)
181. See generally Note, ERISA: To Sue or Not to Sue, supra note 33 (addressing issue
of whether employee benefit plans have standing to sue under ERISA); Annotation, Right of
Pension Plan, As Entity, To Bring Civil Enforcement Action Under § 502 of Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 USCS § 1132), 67 A.L.R. FED. 947 (1984). Cf
Kentucky Laborers Dist. Council Health and Welfare Fund v. Hope, 861 F.2d 1003, 1004-06
(6th Cir. 1988) (ERISA-governed employee health and welfare plan had federal common law
cause of action "to recover benefits allegedly paid in violation of the plan[,]" id. at 1004,
because the plan's state law claims were preempted by ERISA); Kahler Corp. v. John Han-
cock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 4-88-1109 (D. Minn. Oct. 2, 1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS
Database, 1989 WL 119176) (ERISA plans may not sue under ERISA on their own behalf
but may very well have a federal common law claim).
182. See American Fed'n of Unions Local 102 Health & Welfare Fund v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 841 F.2d 658, 665 (5th Cir. 1988) ("there is a conflict
between the Circuits on the issue of union standing"). Compare International Ass'n of Bridge,
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In Fentron Industries, Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension
Fund,188 an employer filed an action against an ERISA-governed
employee pension plan and its trustees for injunctive and declaratory
relief, alleging that the actions of the trustees in cancelling past ser-
vice pension credits of the employer's employees violated ERISA. 8'
In determining whether the employer had standing to sue under
ERISA, the Ninth Circuit applied a three-part test for implied stat-
utory standing. 8 The court stated: "In order to have standing to sue
for violations of a federal statute, a plaintiff must: (1) suffer an in-
jury in fact; (2) fall arguably within the zone of interests protected
by the statute allegedly violated; and (3) show that the statute itself
does not preclude the suit." '86
Applying the above-quoted three-part test for implied statutory
standing, the Fentron court concluded, first, that the employer's in-
juries were specific and personal because "[t]he failure of the Fund
to pay pension benefits will impair [the employer's] relationship with
the Union. 1' 87 Second, the court concluded that the employer's "al-
leged injuries ... fall within the zone of interests that Congress
intended to protect when it enacted ERISA."' 88 Specifically, the
court concluded that Congress, in enacting ERISA, was concerned
with fostering " 'the stability of employment and the successful de-
velopment of industrial relations,' "169 and that "[tihe threat to [the
employer's] relationship with the Union, and to the continued em-
ployment by [the employer] of its employees, falls within this range
of concerns."'1 90 Third, and finally, the court noted that it did not
believe "that Congress, in enacting ERISA, intended to prohibit em-
ployers from suing to enforce its provisions."'" The court stated:
"There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest either that the
Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers Local No. 111 v. Douglas, 646 F.2d 1211, 1214
(7th Cir.) (union has standing to sue under ERISA), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981) with
District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1468, 1476 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (union lacks standing to sue under ERISA).
183. 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1982).
184. Id. at 1303.
185. See Misic v. Building Serv. Employees Health and Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374,
1378 (9th Cir. 1986) (referring to "the three-part test for implied statutory standing outlined
in Fentron").
186. Fentron, 674 F.2d at 1304.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1305.
189. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982)); see also id. (in enacting ERISA "Con-





list of parties empowered to sue under [section 1132(a)] is exclusive
or that Congress intentionally omitted employers."' 92 Thus, the
court held that the plaintiff-employer had standing to sue under
ERISA.
Whether a health care provider has standing to sue under
ERISA under a Fentron-type of analysis has been addressed by only
one court-the Fifth Circuit in Hermann Hospital v. MEBA Medi-
cal & Benefits Plan.9 ' The Fifth Circuit, relying on the Second
Circuit's decision in Pressroom Unions Printers League Income Se-
curity Fund v. Continental Assurance Co.,' " rejected the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning in Fentron. The Fifth Circuit quoted from the
Pressroom (opinion in holding "that 'only Congress is empowered to
grant and extend subject matter jurisdiction of the federal judiciary,
and . . .courts are not to infer a grant a jurisdiction absent clear
legislative mandate.' ""' Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that a health
care provider does not have standing to sue under ERISA under a
Fentron-type of analysis.
One statement made by the Fifth Circuit in the context of its
discussion of whether a health care provider has standing to sue
under ERISA under a Fentron-type of analysis deserves comment.
The court stated:
One case has held that a health care provider possesses no
ERISA standing in its own right. Cameron Manor, Inc. v.
United Mine Workers of America . . . .The Cameron court
cited the Supreme Court's opinion in Franchise Tax Board of
California v. Construction Laborer's Vacation . . . for the
proposition that federal jurisdiction under § 1132(a)(1)(B) "is
limited to suits by the entities specified in the statute." . Al-
though we adopt the literal construction of § 1132(a) and
agree that a health-care provider may not sue as a non-enu-
merated party, we disagree with the court's analysis of
Franchise Tax Board. The Supreme Court did not squarely
address the scope of § 1132(a) and focused instead on general
federal question jurisdiction. The Court certainly did not ad-
dress the status of an assignee of health care benefits, an issue
we address in part II hereof."'
192. Id.
193. 845 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1988). The facts of this case are discussed in detail at
supra note 94.
194. 700 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983).
195. Hernann Hosp., 845 F.2d at 1288 (quoting Pressroom, 700 F.2d at 892).
196. Id. at 1288 n.9 (emphasis added).
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This statement should not be construed as adopting the Cam-
eron court's erroneous conclusion that a health care provider can
never qualify as a beneficiary as defined in section 1002(8) of
ERISA as a matter of law. 197 The Fifth Circuit's statement clearly
indicates that it was adopting only the Cameron court's view that
only participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Secretary of La-
bor may bring civil actions under ERISA. The Fifth Circuit was not
holding that a health care provider can never qualify as a beneficiary
as defined in section 1002(8) of ERISA. As has previously been dis-
cussed,198 the Fifth Circuit was of the opinion that Hermann Hospi-
tal was not claiming to be a beneficiary, and therefore did not ad-
dress the issue of whether a health care provider can qualify as a
beneficiary as defined in ERISA.
III. GARNISHMENT OF EMPLOYEE WELFARE BENEFITS
In seeking to recover benefits due under an ERISA-governed
employee health care plan for services rendered to an individual cov-
ered by the plan, a health care provider is not always limited to
bringing a civil action against the plan under section 1132(a)(1)(B)
of ERISA. The United States Supreme Court recently made clear in
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc.' 99 that a sec-
ond option available to a health care provider is to obtain a money
judgment against the patient for the value of the services rendered
and then invoke state garnishment law to garnish the benefits due
the patient under the plan to satisfy the judgment.200
In Mackey money judgments were obtained by a collection
agency against twenty-three participants in an ERISA-governed em-
ployee welfare benefit plan.20 To .satisfy the judgments, the collec-
tion agency sought to garnish benefits due the participants under the
plan." 2 The collection agency invoked Georgia's general garnish-
ment statute.2 08 The plan responded by asserting that the benefits
due the participants under the plan were exempt from garnishment
197. For a thorough discussion of Cameron, see supra notes 46-76 and accompanying
text (Section II.A.I. Cameron Manor, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America).
198. See supra note 94.
199. 486 U.S. 825 (1988). For student commentary on the Mackey decision see Recent
Case, 27 DuQ. L. REV. 783 (1989).
200. Of course, this assumes that state garnishment law permits garnishment of an em-
ployee's fringe benefits. If state garnishment law does not permit this, then garnishment under
state law is not an option.
201. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 827.
202. Id. at 827-28.
203. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-4-20 to 18-4-135 (1989).
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pursuant to section 18-4-22.1 of the Georgia Code, which provides
in pertinent part that:
Funds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee benefit
plan or program subject to the provisions of the Federal Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended,
shall not be subject to the process of garnishment . . . unless
such garnishment is based upon a judgment for alimony or for
child support . . .s.
The plan argued that since the judgments were not for alimony
or child support, the benefits were exempt from garnishment pursu-
ant to sectjon 18-4-22.1. The collection agency responded that sec-
tion 18-4-22.1 was preempted by ERISA, section 1144(a), 0 5 and
therefore did not operate to exempt the benefits from garnishment.
The plan replied that if section 18-4-22.1 was preempted by ERISA,
then so was Georgia's general garnishment statute and, therefore,
benefits due under the plan were not subject to garnishment.
In deciding the case the Supreme Court engaged in a two-part
inquiry: (1) does ERISA's preemption provision, section 1144(a),
preempt section 18-4-22.1 of the Georgia Code, and (2) if so, does
ERISA's preemption provision also preempt Georgia's general gar-
nishment statute? With respect to the first inquiry, the Court noted
that section 1144(a) of ERISA preempts all state laws insofar as
they "relate to" an employee benefit plan.206 Adhering to its prece-
dents on the issue of when a state law "relates to" an employee ben-
efit plan,2"7 the Court with little difficulty concluded that section 18-
4-22.1 of the Georgia Code was preempted by section 1144(a) of
ERISA. The Court emphasized the fact that section 18-4-22.1 "sin-
gles out ERISA employee welfare benefit plans for different treat-
ment under state garnishment procedures"2 8 and observed that "we
have virtually taken it for granted that state laws which are 'specifi-
cally designed to affect employee benefit plans' are preempted under
§ 514(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)].12 0 9 Moreover, the fact that the
Georgia legislature enacted section 18-4-22.1 to help effectuate what
it perceived to be ERISA's underlying purposes was not, in the
204. Id. § 18-4-22.1 (emphasis added).
205. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). See supra note 10 for the text and a discussion of
section 1144(a).
206. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829.
207. See supra note 10.
208. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 830 (footnote omitted).
209. Id. at 829.
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Court's view, "enough to save the state law from pre-emption." 1'
After concluding that section 1144(a) of ERISA preempts sec-
tion 18-4-22.1 of the Georgia Code, the Court turned to the "more
complex question" '211 of whether section 1144(a) also preempts
Georgia's general garnishment statute. The Court first observed that
"[u]nlike the Georgia antigarnishment provision [§ 18-4-22.1] . . .
Georgia's general garnishment statute does not single out or specially
mention ERISA plans of any kind." '12 This fact, however, was not
decisive because, as the Court stated, "the preemptive force of §
514(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)] is not limited to . . . state laws" '
that single out or specially mention ERISA plans. Thus, the Court
turned to an analysis of whether Georgia's general garnishment stat-
ute "relates to" ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plans
within the meaning of section 1144(a).214 The plan argued that
Georgia's general garnishment statute "relates to" such plans be-
cause under that statute "plan trustees are served with a garnish-
ment summons, become parties to a suit, and must respond and de-
posit the demanded funds due the beneficiary-debtor, ' 21 5 and
because "benefit plans subjected to garnishment will incur substan-
tial administrative burdens and costs." 16 The Court rejected this ar-
gument stating:
In our view . . . certain ERISA provisions, and several aspects
of the statute's structure, indicate that Congress did not intend
to forbid the use of state-law mechanisms of executing judg-
ments against ERISA welfare benefit plans, even when those
mechanisms prevent plan participants from receiving their bene-
fits. Consequently, we join the virtually unanimous view of fed-
eral and state courts which have faced this question, and hold
that federal law does not bar a garnishment action like
respondent's. 2 17
The Court reasoned that section 1132(d)(1)21 of ERISA pro-
vides that an employee benefit plan may "sue or be sued" as an
210. Id.
211. Id. at 830.





217. Id. at 831-32 (footnote omitted).
218. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1) (1982). For the text of section 1132(d)(1), see supra note
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entity and that section 1132(d)(2)25" "contemplates execution of
judgments won against plans in civil actions" '2 but that "ERISA
does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judg-
ments" '221 won against ERISA plans.
Consequently, state-law methods for collecting money judg-
ments must, as a general matter, remain undisturbed by
ERISA; otherwise, there would be no way to enforce such a
judgment won against an ERISA plan. If attachment of ERISA
plan funds does not "relate to" an ERISA plan in any of these
circumstances, we do not see how respondent's proposed gar-
nishment order would do so.
eIt is thus clear enough that money judgments against
ERISA welfare benefit plans, based on state or federal law, won
in state or federal court, must be collectable in some way; gar-
nishment is one permissible method."2 '
The Court also reasoned that ERISA's anti-assignment/anti-
alienation provision, section 1056(d)(1),22 ' which prohibits garnish-
ment of pension plan benefits, does not prohibit garnishment of wel-
fare plan benefits." 4 "Once Congress was sufficiently aware of the
prospect that ERISA plan benefits could be attached and or gar-
nished-as evidenced by its adoption of § 206(d)(1) [29 U.S.C. §
1056(d)(1)]-Congress' decision to remain silent concerning the at-
tachment or garnishment of ERISA welfare plan benefits 'acknowl-
edged and accepted the practice, rather than prohibiting it.' 225
Thus, the Court held that Georgia's general garnishment statute was
not preempted by section 1144(a) and that, therefore, benefits due
under the welfare plan in question were subject to garnishment.2 6
219. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2) (1982).
220. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 834 (footnote omitted).
223. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982).
224. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 836-38; see supra note 108 (quotation from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Mackey).
225. Id. at 837 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 516
(1981)).
226. It is important to note that the Mackey decision deals only with the effect of
ERISA's preemption provision on state garnishment laws insofar as those laws concern
ERISA welfare benefit plans. The Mackey decision does not address the effect of ERISA's
preemption provision on state garnishment laws insofar as those laws concern ERISA pension
benefit plans. Other courts, however, have held that ERISA pension benefits are not subject to
garnishment under state garnishment law. See, e.g., Tenneco, Inc. v. First Va. Bank of Tide-
water, 698 F.2d 688, 690 (4th Cir. 1983) (debtor's pension plan benefits "are beyond the
reach of a writ of garnishment"); General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 463 (6th Cir.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
In Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Construc-
tion Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California,2  a case de-
cided soon after Mackey, the California Court of Appeals held that
under Mackey welfare benefits are subject to garnishment even if the
plan instrument itself contains a spendthrift (or anti-garnishment)
provision.228
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear that Congress, through oversight, failed to consider
the effect of ERISA on health care providers that render services to
participants and beneficiaries in ERISA-governed employee health
care plans. ERISA has been construed as preempting health care
providers' state law claims against ERISA-governed employee health
care plans.229 At the same time, ERISA's civil enforcement provi-
sions do not expressly create a cause of action in favor of health care
providers. To leave health care providers without a remedy, and
thereby force them to refuse to treat participants and beneficiaries in
ERISA-governed employee health care plans, is so inconsistent with
the purposes and policies of ERISA that it must be assumed that
Congress did not intend such a result. The Ninth, Fifth and Seventh
Circuits have recognized this and have held that in cases involving
an assignment of benefits a health care provider has derivative stand-
ing to assert the claims of its assignor under ERISA's civil enforce-
ment provisions. In the district courts in the Third Circuit, however,
health care providers, with one exception, 8' have been denied deriv-
ative standing2"3 and are therefore without a remedy.23 2 Also appar-
1980) ("[W]e conclude that pension plan benefits are not subject to garnishment"); Commer-
cial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizen's Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 526 F. Supp. 510, 521-22 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) ("The Court has concluded that ERISA does not create a federal exemption for
pension benefits and thus even under a narrow reading of ERISA's preemption provision, state
law governing commercial garnishment of pension benefits would necessarily be preempted").
As discussed at supra note 149, however, courts have recognized numerous implied excep-
tions to the general rule that ERISA pension benefits are not subject to garnishment.
227. 204 Cal. App. 3d 955, 251 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1988).
228. Id. at 966-67, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 603-04. See supra notes 162-74 and accompanying
text for a thorough discussion of the Franchise Tax Board case.
229. See cases cited at supra note 24.
230. Albert Einstein Medical Center v. National Benefit Fund for Hosp. and Health
Care Employees, No. 89-5931 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database,
1989 WL 156374).
231. Health Scan, Ltd. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1989);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund, 695 F. Supp. 181, 184
(E.D. Pa. 1988).
232. Of course, a health care provider can try to estabish that it has standing to sue in
its own right under the theory that it qualifies as a beneficiary as defined in section 1002(8) of
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ently without a remedy in any circuit is a health care provider that
does not have an assignment or that has an invalid assignment. In
light of this situation, Congress should amend section 1132(a) of
ERISA to include health care providers among the list of persons
expressly empowered to sue under that section.
ERISA. See supra notes 41-94 and accompanying text. (Section II.A. Persons Expressly Em-
powered by Section 1132(a) of ERISA to Sue). Also, there is always the "remedy" of garnish-
ment under state law in states that allow garnishment of an employee's fringe benefits. See
supra notes 199-228 and accompanying text (Section III. GARNISHMENT OF EMPLOYEE WEL-
FARE BENEFITS). Finally, at least two district courts in the third circuit have held that certain
state law claims of health care providers are not preempted by ERISA. Albert Einstein Medi-
cal Center v. National Benefit Fund for Hosp. and Health Care Employees, No. 89-5931(E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1989) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database, 1989 WL 156374) (provider's
state law claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit and promissory
estoppel not preempted "to the extent that plaintiffs are claiming an independent right to
payment, apart from the terms of the plan"); Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Action Mfg.
Co., 697 F. Supp. 883, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (provider's state law estoppel claim not
preempted).

